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If [one] freeman lies with the wife of [another] freeman, let him
pay recompense [with] her wergeld [man-price] and obtain
another wife ffor the husband} [with} his own money and bring
her to the other man at home.
Laws of Aethelberht (597x614) No. 31

very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student
of history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive
time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the
custom, belief or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The
reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and
ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be
accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of which seems
to explain it and reconcile it with the present state of things; and
then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been
found for it, and enters on a new career.

A

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881)

The history of man indicates that as soon as he created the
relationship of marriage, "adultery was not far behind. "
Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Laws on Adultery-A Synopsis,
1 J. Fam. L. 89, 89 (1961)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. An Immodest Hypothetical
You have been married for ten years, and you have two children.

You

would describe life in your marriage neither as being tethered to a rock and
having your liver consumed on a daily basis nor as Elysian bliss every
moment of every day. On average, your married life has been something in
between, and it sometimes drifts near one extreme or the other.

You

sometimes find your spouse relatively boring and other people more
exciting.

1

Nonetheless, you have remained sexually faithful to your spouse

since exchanging wedding vows, which you vaguely remember included

1.
Being both a sensitive and perceptive person, you realize that other people may seem
more exciting in comparison with your spouse, because you do not have to interact with them
on paying bills, changing diapers, buying groceries, and many of the other sometimes mundane
duties that accompany marriage.

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
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something about loving and honoring your spouse, and even forsaking all
others and keeping only unto your spouse. 2
One day, after you take the kids to school, you pay a surprise visit to

your spouse at work.

You walk into your spouse's office to find your

spouse and a co-employee on the floor engaged in sexual intercourse. What

do you want to do?

A. Kill your spouse.

B. Kill your spouse's partner.

C. Kill your spouse and your spouse's partner.
D. Sue your spouse's partner.

E. Divorce your spouse.

F. All of the above, except E. 3

In most states in this nation, you will not be implementing choice D

because the law does not permit such lawsuits. Furthermore, the law will
not permit you to perform the executions in choices A through. C and F
without visiting some consequences upon you. 4 Thus, under.the current law
in most jurisdictions, you probably will be limited to choice E.

B. The Strange Case of the Disappearing Torts

Why do the laws of most states not permit you to sue your spouse's

partner?

If you are willing to forego killing her or him (which past

civilizations assumed you would do) why can you not sue the marital

interloper? If instead of engaging in sex with your spouse, the other person

had walked up to you and taken a swing at you and hit you, you would have

had a tort action for battery (and probably assault). If the person 11ad taken
a swing at you and missed, you probably would have had a tort action for
assault. The person has sex with your spouse, and you have no tort action
against that person. 5 What does it say about contemporary American tort
2.

Traditional Wedding Vow.
Choice E is excluded if you exercise all other options. If you kill your spouse, the
3.
marriage ends, and it is not necessary (and probably would be unseemly in any event) to divorce
her or him. If you kill your spouse's partner, however, choice D still would be possible. You
might still assert a claim against the deceased partner's estate, although this option, too, seems
unseemly.
It has not always been so. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
4.
My point here is to focus on the interest of the plaintiff that is invaded and the
5.
magnitude of the banns suffered by the plaintiff in each of these situations. I real\ze that there
are significant differences, other than the magnitude of the hann suffered, betwee,n �attery and
assault, on the one hand, and alienation of affections and criminal conversation on the other.
One may insist, for example, that the sexual autonomy of a third party, the participating spouse,
is an interest at stake in alienation of affections and criminal conversation, but third-party
autonomy is not at issue in the hypothetical battery and assault. Consideration of that point will

33:0985)
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law6 and society that you cannot sue one wbo interferes in, and perhaps
destroys, your marriage by engaging in sexual relations with your spouse?
Alienation of affections and criminal conversation have been
disappearing from American tore law for sixty-five years. Very few states
still recognize either tort theory or both.7 As once recognized by almost all
states, criminal conversation was a simple tort. It was tbe tort theory a
i tiff could pursue against a third party who had sexual relations with the
plan

plaintiffs spouse.8 There was no defense other than the nonparticipating
lake us quickly into a vilification ofthe plaintiff's in1eres1 in exclusive sexual relations wilh ber
or his spouse as an archaic and discrediled properfy in1erest. I appreciale !hat argument, and I
will address lhal issue presently. See infra noies 138-156 and accompanying 1ext. For now,
focus on the magnjlllde of lhe hann IO the plain tif.f Even crilics of alienation of affections and

criminal conversation recognize lhnl the nonparticipating spouse suffers an emotionally painful,
and pe r11aps debilitating, inJWJI. See. e.g.. Manha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic:

Rejlec1io11s on Sex Scandals and rhe Military, 83 MI NN. L. REV. 305, 339-41 (1998)
i
(nclmowledgng
lhal adullery "may give rise 10 serious rcla1i onal harms, wbe1her or not
accompanied by deceil," and describi ng 1he wound 10 "manly pride" in some cases as "a kind of
emasculation"). For discuss ion of the emolional harm caused by adullery, see generally JANIS

ABRAHMS SPRING, AJ.iER THE AFFAIR: HEALING THE PAIN AND REBUILDING 1)\UST WllEN A
PARTI'1ER HAS Bm.i UNFAITHFUql996).
The.o;e issues are at tl1e interM:ction of tort law and family law See Linda L. Berger,
6.
Lies Between Mommy and Daddy: 11re Case for Recognizing Spousal Emotional Dlstrtss
Claims Based on Damesrlc Decelr Thar Interferes with Parent-Child Relationships, 33 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 449, 45 l (2000) (discussing lhe conflict inherent in domestic tortS being at the
wilh
in1ersccti on of family Jaw and tort Jaw). The view tha1 one takes of lhese nterferences
i
family relationships, whether primarily from the perspective of tort law or prirnarily from lhe
perspective of family Jaw, can make a difference in whelher one favors recognition or abolition
of a tort cause of aclion. Consider, for example, the position ofProfessor Jane Murphy who, in
discussing lhe morality of family Jaw, identities lhe goal of protecting children as the central
moral goal offamily Jaw. Jane. C. Murphy, Rules. Responsibility and Commlrmem ro Children:
71re New Language ofMorality In Pamlly Law, 60 U. PflT. L. REV. 1111, 1116-17 (1999).
Viewing adultery from the perspective oftort law, I would not identify protection of chi ldren as
the central goal. I think, however, it is an important goal, and I do contend !hat it is a goal that
may be promoted by rccognjzin.g a right IO a remedy against a marital interloper .
7.
DAN B. Doses, 2 Tue LA w OF ToRTS 1247 (200I) [hereinafter Doses]. See generally
W. PAGE KEETON ETAL, PROSStR ANO KEETON ON THE I.AW OF TORTS,§ 124 (Sib ed. 1984 &
Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER]. In a recent case, lhe Soulh Dakota Supreme Court, refusing
to abolish the tort of alienation of affections, S\ll'Veyed lhe current state of the law: thirty-four
states had abolished lhe tori by legislation; five had abolished it judicially; Louisiana had never
recognized it (IO be qualified later); and Alaska bad no stalllte or case law on the issue. Veeder
v. Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610, 614 nn.3-4 (S.D. 1999) (citing cases from eachjurisdiction). Thai
leaves only nine states that definitely recognize alienation of affections: Hawaii, lllinois,
Mississippi Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Norlb Carolina, South Dakota, a.nd Utah.
Id. at 614 n.6. Criminal conversation may be recognized in fewer jurisdictions. For example,
the Mississippi and Utah Supreme Courts preserved alienation of affections but abolished
criminal conversation. Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 1214, 1214 (Miss. 1992); Norton v.
Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 15-17 (Utah 1991).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS§ 685 (1977) [hereinafter llEsTATEMENT]; Doees,
8.
supra note 7, at 1246; see also 2 FOWLER v. H�RPER ET AL, TuE I.Aw OF TORTS, at 506 n.6
.

,

990
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spouse's consent.9 The third party's knowledge of the marital relationship
was not part of the plaintiff's prima facie case, and lack of such knowledge
10
did not provide an affinnative defense.
Alienation of affections was not as simple. The name suggests that the
recovery is for the defendant's destroying the affection of one spouse for
the other. ln reality, however, the recovery was for loss of consonium,
sexual
relations, society, and
meaning rights to monopolistic
companionship.11
The plaintiff had to establish the existence of the
marriage with some accompanying affection, that the love and affection
12
were destroyed, and that the acts of the defendant caused the destruction.
Plaintiffs could recover without proof of adultery, without provin that the
spouse bad left the home, and without proving pecuniary loss. 3 Some
authorities say that an absence of affection between the spouses defeats the
action, but most courts presume some affection, holding that even a bad
marriage has some hope of reconciliation." Bad relations and lack of
affection between the spouses were often treated as mitigating damages. u

�

The defendant must have engaged in some affinnative conduct intended to
diven the attentions of plainti.frs spouse, although that conduct need not

(2nd ed. 1986) ("The bruiis of the action is lhe loss of sexual monopoly alone and Ion of
eo1UOnium n
i 0�1cr rcspeclS is unnecessary.'').
9.
RESTATEMENT, Jupra notc 8, § 687; DoBBS, supra note 7, at 1246.
10. RESTATEMENT, 1upra note 8, § 68S cmt. t; Doeas, 1upa note 7, at 1246.
Aff«riDnJ, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472, 472
11. Rober1 C. Brown, The Actionfor Alienation of
(1934) \Despite the name which i s wli11ersaUy gi'ICR to lhls IClion, it is almost unanimously
agreed that the gist of 11is not the loss of affcc:tions but 111hcr the loss of cooown-.
orti
concept
of very much broader eontcnL")(footnote omitted); Nathan P.Feinsingcr, Uglslatfre Attack on
'"Hean Balm," 33 MJOI. !.. REv. 979, 994 (1935) ("Despite lhe name given to lhc aclion, n
i
law lhe injury includes not merely loss of affection bul also services, socieiy, and sexual
n
i tercourse , as denoted by �1e lcnn 'consortium.' ").
12. REsTATEMENT, s11pra nolc 8, § 683 & cmts. r, g, I; Hulelmyer v. Cox, Sl4 S.E.2d SS4,
SS9 (N. C.Ct. App.1999), review denied, 514 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999), appeal dlJmlssed, 542
S. E.2d 211 (N.C.2000).
13. Feinsingcr, supra note 11, at 994.
14. "A marriage teetering on lhe brink of domestic disaster should nevertheless be spared
a sbo11e O\'C! the precipice." Creason v. Myers, 3SO N.W.2d S26, S28 (Neb. 1984); stt also
Brown. supra note 11 , ll 488 (''The weight of aulhoril)' ICelllS to be .. that total lad: of
affection between the spouses is not a bar to liabitil)' . . . . [P)laintiff should not be deprived of
lhe chance, whatever it may be worth, of subsequently effecting a reconciliation wilh his
spouse."); REsTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 683 cmL f (while maintaining lhat loss of affection
must be proven by objective indicators, comment also stales that "[ i]f any affeclion rcrnsined,
its deslruction or di.minulion may be the basis of an acto
i n.''); HARPER ET AL, supra note 8, at
S08-09 (''[O]thers have taken the position lhat there may have been a chance for a reconciliation
even between estranged spouses and the plaintiff ought not to be deprived of lhat chance or
ha11e i t made more remote.").
IS. Brown, supra DOte 11, 81488; HARPER ET AJ...,supra note 8, at 508.
.
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have been sexual relations.16 Indeed, in many cases, the action was brought
not against a lover who bad committed adultery with the spouse, but against
parents or other close relatives of the spouse who sought to persuade the
spouse to leave the plaintiff or otherwise interfered in the marriage.17 As
with other torts, the causation standard did not require that the wrongful
conduct of the defendant be the sole cause of the alienation; rather, it was
stated in terms such as "substantial factor,"18 or "controlling or effective
cause."19 For a defendant to be liable for alienation of affections, it was
required that the defendant know or believe that the person whose affections
were alienated was married.w
2
The two tort theories thus are separate theories with distinct elements 1
and distinguishable historical pedigrees.22 Criminal conversation is "the
more definite action,"" in that the conduct of the defendant that must be
proven is adultery, and the damages are recoverable without establishing a
causal link between any damages and tbe defendant's wrongful conduct.
Alienation of affections, on the other hand, is the more amo:J> hous action, in
that various types of conduct, including "mere" persuasion, are actionable,
and the fact finder must contemplate the chimerical causal link.
There are similarities between criminal conversation and alienation of
affections, however. One seldom secs a theoretical discussion of one ton
without the other. ft has been argued that they are alike in both their private
function of providing compensation for an injury to a plaintiff and their
public function of "prevent[ ing] and punish[ing] intentional interference
with the husband-wife relationship and the violation of accepted canons of
social conduct."25 Moreover, in most cases in which the alleged wrongful
conduct is adultery, both theories are asserted.26
16. HARPER ET AL,supra O()(t 8, at 509.
17. Brown, supra DOie 11, at 483.
18. RESTATEMENT,supra DOit8, § 683 ctnl k; DOBBS, supra note 7. at 1 246.
19. Hutelmyer v . Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999), review denietl, 514
S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999}, appeal dismissed, 542 S.E.2d 211(N.C. 2000).
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 683 cmt. �DOBBS,supra note 7, at 1246.
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 683 emt. e; HARPER ET AL, supra DOie 8. at 513.
22. Feinsinger, supra note 11, at 987; see also infra notes 61-91 and accompanying text
(discussing historical roots of the torts).
23. Brown, supra nO!e 11, at 474.
24. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contrac111al Rela1ionships, 34
ARK. L. REV. 335, 344-46 (1980).
25. Feinsinger,supra nO!C 11, at 988-89 (footnote omitted).
26. See, e.g., Hultlmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554, 559 (N.C. Cl App. 1999), review denied,
514 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999), appeal dismissed, 542 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 2000); �ATEMENT,
supra note 8, § 683 crnt e; Kay Kavanagh, Note, Alienation of Afef ctions and Criminal
Conversation: UnholyMarriage in Need ofAnnulment, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 323, 323 (1981).
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Most people in the legal profession Jiave taken little note of the passittg
of these obscure tort theories; .derisively referred to as two of the "heart
balm" 'torts.27 Since 1935, legislatures and, · less frequently, courts hav�
discarded these tort theories. Reasons articulated for the abolition of these
torts usually are selected from a "cookie cutter" list. Most of the reasons,
articulated by legislatures, courts, . and commentators are superficial and
lack rigorous analysis.28 This is· a singular everit. Who in her right mind
would throw away a perfectly good tort theory of recovery? It seems
almost un-American:
.

·

C. An Immodest Hypothetical Revisited: Some Hyperbolic
Thoughts About the :Torts

1.

Point

·Because your spouse coµunitted adultery, ·you probably did not live in
one of the minority of states that oohtmue to recognize the tort theories of
recovery for alienation of affections· or criminal conversation. If you ha�
odds are your spouse would not" have con;unitted adllltery because there
would have been few partners who would have risked ruinous financial
liability as the price for enjoying sexual relations with your otherwise·
irresistible spouse. Your marriage arid family would have been preserved.
That would have been good for you b�cause you would have had a faithful
and devoted sp0use. With the market closed for extramarital escapadest.
..

The other two heart balni'lortS are breach of a promise to matty and seduction. Note1
1770� 1771 n.4 (1985) (describing the
term as a "sardonic reference to the broken peart" that justified a lawsuit); see also id. at 1778
("The derisive term 'heartbalm' attached to the breach of promise action is an indication that
public policy no longer considers money damag�s appropriate for what is perceived as only an
ordinary broken heart.").
28. There are courts and commentators, however, that have concluded, after careful and
well-reasoned analyses, that the torts should not be retained. Professor Dan Dobbs, for
example, rendered a. thorough and thought-provoking challenge of the "interference tortsH
generally, including alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Dobbs, supra note 24.
Dobbs offers . "a modest expression of doubt, in effect notes toward a sceptical [sfo]:
reconception of the interferencetorts.1' Id: at 337. ·Professor Dobbs' ·expressiops of doubt ate,
directed more to interference with business or. contractual relations than to alienation of
affections 'and criminal conversation, but- many of his concerns also apply to these two tort
theories as specific types of interference torts. See id. at 355 ("To the extent that these problems
are merely special versions of the interference with contract rules, they furnish. no basis, for
supporting those rules-they reflect the rules under attack here but do not justify them.")<
Professor Martha Chamallas has leveled a thoughtful· attack against alienation of affections and
criminal conversation that en:iphasizes femiiiist concerns. See Chamallas, $Upra note 5, at
333-42.
27.

Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, .83 MICH L. REV.

·

.

·
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your spouse either would have to be faithful to you or divorce you, and
there are substantial 'costs (financial, emotional, etc.) associated with
divorce. It would have been good for yom children, who may suffer from
growing up with divorced parents.29 Finally, it would have been good for
contemporary American society ·which, with almost half of all marriages
ending in divorce (one of the world's superpowers in divorces),30 is
suffering all the ill effects that accompany the decline and fall of the
traditional nuclear family.· But, alas, you were not fortunate enough to live
.
in a state that protects the marital relationship through tort law..
·

2.

Counterpoint

But suppose that you lived in one of the few states that does recognize
alienation of affections or criminal conversation. Your spouse simply
happened to be determined and, against all odds,31 found one of the few
reckless, sex-crazed persons who would throw caution to the wind and risk
liability. Having come upon your spouse and partrier in jlagrante delicto,
you realize that it would be inappropriate to sue your spouse's partner. You
realize that you and your spouse are autonomous human beings, not each
other's property, who, notwithstanding your wedding vows and children,
are free to divorce if you choose to do so. Accordingly, you reason that
since your spouse could divorce you, you have no right to sue anyone who
has sex with your spouse while you are still married . . Indeed, you may want
to remain married, notWithstanding your spouse's adultery. Therefore, it
simply would not be fair to: sue the person who interfered with your
marriage. Moreover, on reflection, you realize that your spouse's adultery
may not be the fault of the potential defendant.. It is likely that you have
driven your spouse to this end and ·thus made your spouse available to the
partner. Had you been a better �arriage companion, this might not have
29. See, e.g., JUDITH wALLERSTEIN ET AL, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE
(2000).
30. Joan Lowy, U.S. Divorce, Marriage Rates on the Decline, ·DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 3,
2000, at 8 . See generally GLENDA RILEY, D IVORCE:· AN AMERICAN TRADITION 190 (1991)
(concluding that family will "survive and adapt" in America, but ''Americans will divorce").
The United States does not have the highest . divorce rate in the world. Walter Kim,
Divorce/The Debate: Should You Stay Together for the Kids? nME, Sept. 25, 2000, at 74.
Russia (65%), Sweden (64%), Finland (56%), and Britain (53%) have higher rates than the
United States' 49%. Id. But the United States � just behind the countries with a rate of
50% or more. Id.
31. See AGAINST ALL ODDS (Columbia TriStar 1984) (bad movie with a lot of sex and a
lust triangle, but a great title song by Phil Collins). Although this footnote seems superfluous, I
do wish to make a point later abOut movies, television; and other media, and adultery and
society's values.
·

·

·

·

·
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happened. This realization moves you and causes you to apologize to your
spouse and the partner who seem somewhat unreceptive during their frantic
efforts

to

make

themselves

more

presentable.

As

you

further

dispassionately consider the matter, you realize that many people have
affairs in contemporary American society, and if you sue and the idea
catches on, you may make adultery less fashionable and less available.
Who knows, you may want to engage in adultery yourself some dayl
Finally, although your sexual ego has srtffered a not insignificant blow, you

decide to be assertive and self-affirming, and you refuse to be viewed as a

pathetic victim who blames your sad state on your spouse and your spouse's
paramour.

Having considered all this, you walk away, chuckling to

yourself about how archaic are laws that permit one to sue a person for
having sex with one's spouse.

For many good reasons, you have decided

that you will not avail yourself of those laws. When it comes to sex, it is a
jungle out there. Or, come to think of it, in modem terms, it is like a free
market. Although you are hurt, you know that less government regulation
of the market is always better.

Competition is always the best policy'

choice.

D. With a Bang or a Whimper?
Although alienation of affections and criminal conversation are fading
from American tort law, a case in North Carolina a few years ago

!

temporaril
brought these old, odd torts to the nation's collective
3
attention; that is to say, the case attracted extensive media attention and
generated tantalizing headlines and sound bytes, including coverage in "The

3 2. Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554, 559 (N.C. Ct. App . 1999), review denied, 5 14
S.E . 2d 146 (N.C. 1999), appea l dismissed, 542 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 2000). The Hutelmyer case
was the most high-profile case, but there were three North Carolina jury verdicts awarding
subs tantial damages for alienation of affec tions and criminal conversation in 1997. Jennifer E.
McDougal, Legislating Morality: The Actions for Alienation of Affections and Criminal
Conversation in North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 163 , 177 (1 998). In January of
1997, a North Carolina jury awarded a wife $1 . 2 million agains t her husband's secretary. Id. at
177 n. l 09. The jury viewed videotape footage of the husband of seventeen years and his
secretary having intercourse on the office floor. Id. The tape was produced by a camera placed
in the conference room by a detective hired by the plaintiff-wife. Id. at 177 n. 1 09 (citing Poon
Rhee, Jury: Husband-Stealing Secretary Owes $1 Million to Man's Ex-Wife, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Aug. 9, 1997, at IA). In the third case, the jury applied a formula of $100 for each
day of the defendant's affair with the plaintiff's wife, plus $50,000 in damages for criminal
conversation and $100,000 in punitive damages to arrive at a damages award of $243 ,000 for

the aggrieved husband. Id. at 1 77-78. See also $1.4 Million Awa rded in Alienation Lawsuit,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh) , May 24, 2001 , A4 (reporting on an alienation of affection verdict
which is thought to be the largest in the state).
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34
33
Nation's Newspaper," on television news magazine shows, and a made
35
for-television movie.
Dorothy Hutelmyer sued her husband's secretary
(and next wife), Margie Cox, for having an affair with her husband and
allegedly thereby taking him away from her after eighteen years of
36
marriage.
Mrs. Hutelmyer (Dorothy) won a jury verdict awarding her a
million dollars-half a million in compensatory damages and half a million
in punitive damages. My suspicion is that the media embraced the case not
because it presented fascinating legal issues, but because it was about
primal human drives and emotions-sex, passion, infidelity, and revenge.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals appeared to be sympathetic to the
defendant's argument that the tort theories of alienation of affections and
criminal conversation should be abolished, but the majority declared that it
was not its prerogative to overrule or ignore clear decisions of the state
37
Moreover, as one opinion in the case noted, the North
supreme court.
Carolina legislature had recently defeated a bill that would have abolished
38
the cause of action for alienation of affections.
The typical responses to the anomaly of North Carolina's retention of
these two torts have been polarized.

One position, only somewhat

hyperbolically stated, is that, while the rest of the nation is "going to hell in
a handbasket," North Carolina stands as the guardian of morality, the

33. See Carrie Hedges, North Carolina Taking Cheating Hearts to Task, USA 'IbDAY,
Sept. 19, 1997, at 3A; Karen S. Peterson, Million-Dollar Message from Ex-Wife, Jury, USA
TODAY, Aug. 8, 1997, at ID.
34. E.g., Dateline NBC: Three's Company; Woman Accused of Breaking Up Marriage
Sued by Ex-Wife (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 15, 1997). Co-anchor Jane Pauley's lead-in
demonstrates why alienation of affections and criminal conversation are good grist for the
popular media mill:
If hell hath no fury like a woman scorned, wait till you see what happens
when she gets a good lawyer and a sympathetic jury. Tonight, the story of a
married man who left his wife for someone else. It happens all the time. But
this story has a stunning twist, the woman left behind decided there should be
a price for a marriage destroyed. But he won't have to pay it.
Id.

35. The Price of a Broken Heart (Lifetime television broadcast, Aug. 16, 1999).
36. The Hutelrnyers were married on October 14, 1978. Hutelmyer, 514 S.E.2d at 557.
During their marriage, they had three children. Id. Mr. Hutelrnyer "left the marital home" on
January 5, 1996. Id. A divorce followed. Id. On May 15, 1997, Mr. Hutelrnyer married Ms.
Cox. Id.
37. Id. at 562.
38. Id. at 563 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Legislative
Tally: Capital Correspondence-How Triangle Members of the General Assembly Voted on
Bills ofNote, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Apr. 19, 1999, at A3 (reporting that bill to abolish
common law civil actions of alienation of affections and criminal conversation failed by vote of
55-58).
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nemesis of adulterers, and the savior of families and marriages.

39

The

diametrically opposed position is that old-fashioned and unenlightened
North Carolina has perpetuated legal relics from an era when women were
regarded as the property of husbands, and the torts serve no good purpose in
contemporary society. 40

Very few in the legal· community defend. the
41
Aside from the Hutelmyer cause
continued existence of these torts.
celebre, the abrogation of these torts has attracted little attention, and they
soon may be gone. Will they be missed?

E. Worth Considering From Perspectives of Tort Law and Society

From the perspective of American tort law as it evolved in the twentieth
century,

the

abrogation

of

alienation

of

affections

and

criminal

conversation, the near unanimity of that change, and the facile recitation of
42
reasons are remarkable.
The reasons given in 1935 by Indiana, Illinois,
and New York when these states abolished these torts were a smoke
44
43
and should be debunked once and for all.
Since that time, courts,

screen

legislators,

and

commentators

have

continued

to

recite

those

same

unpersuasive reasons for abolishing or not recognizing the torts.
39. Editorial, Alienation

of Affections:

Unfashionable

but Handy-North

Carolina

Shouldn't Worry About Being Old-Fashioned, NEWS & REc. (Greensboro), Aug.9, 1997, at A8;
Cindi Andrews, Love's Legal Loss, NEWS & REc. (Greensboro), Aug. 16, 1997, at A81. The
Andrews article quotes the Reverend Don Carter, Pastor of the Baptist Temple of Alamance
County: "I certainly hope [the Hutelmyer verdict] sends out a strong signal to people that
adultery is wrong .. .. I'm afraid today that through television and the film industry and books,
we have glorified infidelity, almost made it a game." Id.
40.

See Andrews, supra note 39. The article quotes University of North Carolina, Chapel

Hill Law School Professor Sally Sharp: "It derives from the time when, if you took my wife, it
was comparable to stealing my cow . . . . The continued existence of these medieval causes of
action is a disgrace to the state of North Carolina." Id. See also Sally Kalson, A Cheating
.
Husband Is Hardly a Victim, PITI. POST-GAZETIF., Sept. 22, 1997, at B l ("It's a quaint notion,
likening a spouse to a piece of private property that can be stolen from its rightful owner like a
lawnmower."). See also Jill Jones, Comment, Fanning an Old Flame: Alienation ofAffections

and Criminal Conversation Revisited, 26 PEPP.L. REV. 61, 62-63 (1998) (quoting lawyers and
law professors).
41. See Terry Carter, 'She Done Me Wrong,' AB.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 24.
42. Even
of surprise.

as

the abrogation bandwagon began to roll in 1935, there were some expressions

An article by a Fordham law professor published the year after heart balm

legislation was ·enacted in Indiana, Illinois, and New York, questioned the wisdom of the
legislation and termed it "almost unprecedented." Frederick L. Kane, Heart Balm and Public
Policy, 5 FORDHAM L.REv. 63, 63 (1936). Another of the early articles discussing the "attack"
on the torts referred to the "unusual legislative receptivity'' to efforts to abolish the torts.
Feinsinger, supra note 11, at 979.
43. Kane, supra note 42, at 71 (''having had one important change in our fundamental law
foisted upon us under a smoke screen of false agitation").
44. For such a debunking, see infra notes 129-201 and accompanying text.
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If the reasons originally given for abrogation of the torts are without
merit, did better reasons exist at that time or have other reasons arisen since
that time that justify nonrecognition? American tort law has changed in
ways that seem inconsistent with the abrogation of these torts or the failure
to reconsider them. Tort law has expanded substantially and recognized
several new tort theories.•5 Thus, where victims of injuries have been
identified, ton law generally has sought to provide remedies. During that
snme period of tort expansion, few established theories of recovery have
been eliminated by most states.46 Old tort theories of recovery have been
expanded or revised to bring novel and contemporary fact patterns within
their covcrage.'7 Moreover, American tort law has shifted its virtually
exclusive focus on protecting the "hard" n
i terests of person and property,
and increasingly protected "soft" interests in relationships and emotions..,
4S. Consider, for example, invasion ofprivlC)', mtcntional infliction of emotional distress,
and wrongful 1emuna11on. Reprding these ION 1nd lhc char8cteristics of proposed or
emerging ION that indicate the likelihood oflhcir success, sec Anila Bems1ein, How to Maki a
Nrw Ton: 71ortt Parodoxu, 1S TtX. L REV. 1539 (1997).
46. Dobbs, S11pro no1c 24, 11 355 ("(l)t is interestina IO notice Iha! one or lhc few
tcndcnc1ca IO constnct liability in ion has occumd in (mterfe"'nce wilh marriage]."): stt also
Donald C. Dowling. Jr., if Controc:t 17reory for a Complex Ton: Limiting lnterf•,.•nce \t.iltlt
ConlmCt B<'yond the Un/a,.ful M<'ans Tut, 40 U. MIAMI L REV. 487, 489 (1986) ("[T]he besl
modem example or rcsnictina ton liabohty deals with an action c\ofcly "'laled 10 lhc
inlerfCJence ions: cnminal convc1$ation.").
47. See. <'.g., Rohen M. Ackenn&I\ Tort Law and Comnounlturlan/Jno: Jllloere Rights Meet
RtspenSlbWtia, 30 WAK£ FOREST L. REV. 649, 651 (1995) ("Dilling lhc past thirty ycais, lhc
protections furnished by the law of tons have eo<pandcd, and wit\ lhat expension has come an
augmcn111ion of 1he du11es owed 10 one's fellow citluns."); Dowling, supra no1e 46, at 488

("'The lus1ory ofton law inthe twentieth ccniury is one of expansion. Historically, those who
ba''C uJU<d against the spread of liAbility have o�n done so in vain.j. Mr. Dowling docs
note, however, lhat lhc interfemicc tons, in which he includes in1erf=nce with c:ontr.u:t and
interference wilh business "'lations, do not fit lhe paltem or expansion, having grown no
broader than in the mid-ninetecnlh ccnrury. Id. An example of a new duty is an emerging duty
to rescue undc:r some circumstances. Seegarually Steven J. Heyman, Foundations ofthe Duty
10 RUOI<', 47 vAND. L. REY. 673 ( 1994). Another duty recopoiud only n
i lhc
i �cnl year$ s
duty 10 protect agllnst
i third-party criminal activity, even bcyoad the boundaries of business
premises. Su, ,.,g., Banks v. Hyau Co!J>., 722 F.2d 214 (5tb Cir. 1984). Old ion lhcories, such
11 battery, ha,·c been applied 10 new flict si111alions such 11 sexual int=owsc bdwcen spouses
when one has engaged n
i an extramariial affair. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994) (more
about this case later). A di!TCJent view or the recent hi.story of 1on Jaw is offered by Professor
David Robenson, whom I thank for pointing out that lhc last IWcnty years or so has been a
period of contmction in ton law. Examples ofsuch contnlc1ion mclude the recopoi1ion of new
defenses 10 tort liability and limi1ations of products liability.
48. Nancy Levi� Ethereal Torts, 61 GOO. WASH. L. R£v. 136 (1992); if. Martha
Ownallas, � Arrhit«llln ofBias: Dl!<'p S1n1etuns in Ton Law, 146 U. PA. L. Rf.v. 463,
489-502 (1998) (recognizing liberalization n
i ton law in recognition of rte0vay for emotional
and "'lational injuries, but 11gUing lhat the"' is still an "implicit hienuchy ofvalue" n
i which
physical n
i jury and propc:ny loss arc considered mo"' valuable).
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Some of the types of relationships for which tort law provides redress for
injuries include family, community, political, employment, and trade..49
Given these trends in modem tort law; who would have predicted that most
states would discard two tort theories with historical pedigrees that purpolt

to protect against . or redress injury to emotional well-being in the most
· the family? 50
sacrosanct of all relationshipsFrom the perspective .of American society, from which tort law derives
the . values and interests for which it . provides redress when injuries ar:e
sustained, it is not easy to explain why legislatures and courts have been
willing to eradicate alienation of affections and criminal conversatio�
These torts are said to protect the interest people .have against interferenea
in their family relations. 51 · Most Ainericans say that families52 and
marriage53 are important to them. . Moreover, in polls, most Americans sa,
they consider adultery morally wrong.-54 For the last two decades, "familJ
49. In a four-part series of articles, Professor Leon Green described the role of tort law i':n
protecting relational interests. Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 IU.. L. REV. 460, 46i
(1934) (part one: discussing family relations); 29 ILL L. REv. 1041 (1935) (part two: discussing
trade relations); 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935) (part three: discussing commercial relations); 30 ILI..
L. REV. 3 14 (1935) (part four: discussing professional and political relations).
50. Professor Feinsinger described the public and private functions of both tort theories llllJ
compensating for a loss. of consortium injury and '4prevent[ing] and punish[ ingl intentiotlli'I
interference with the husband-wife relationship and the · violation of accepted canons of soci'll1:
conduct." Feinsinger, supra note 1 1 , at 988·89; cf. Brown, supra note 1 1 , at 472 (describittg
purpose of alienation of affections as ''protecting marital relations from unjustifiabl�
interference by outsiders").
5 1. See DoBBS, suprrz note 7, at 1245-55 (discussing "interference with famil:gi
relationships").
52. One need only listen to politicians' speeches to appreciate the importance of talking
about family values. Indeed, most Americans say that family is more important to them tba1'll
money and wealth. See, e.g., Jeff Kunerth, AA.RP Says Americans Value Family Over Riches ar
Orlando, Fla., Convention, ORLA.Noo SENTINEL (May 17, 2000) (discussing AA.RP SUl'VeJ
commissioned by Modern Mrzturity magazine in which eighty percent of those surveyed defined
success as having a good family, marriage, and education, whereas only tw�ty-seven percettt
measured success in terms of wealth). Notwithstanding Americans' professed devotion family and family values, the "traditional family" is diminishing as a reality.
53. Although it is safe to say that Americans today will say tbat they cherish family,
American society seems equivocal on the· matter of inarriage. Michael A. Fletcher, For Bettel?

or Worse, Marriage Rates Hit a Low; Study R,.eports New Lows for Marriage Rates an d Weddt!I
Bliss, WASH. POST, July 2, 1999, at Al. Divorce rates soared until the mid-1980s, with the ra�
leveling off slightly below fifty percent See James Herbie DiFonzo, <;:ustomized Marriage, �
IND. L.J. 875, 877-78 (2000). The cover of a recent issue of Time magazine had ·a photograpll
of the cast of the Home Box Office series Sex and the City and bore the caption, 'JWho Needs. .a

Husband?" 'IlME, Aug. 28, 2000. The accompanying story discusses the phenomenon of womet1
deciding not to marry. Tamala M. Edwards, Flying Solo, 'IlME, Aug. 28, 2000. According tQ
the story, forty percent of adult females are single compared with thirty percent in 1960. Id.
54. See, e.g., AllPolitics, How Do Americans View Adultery?, at http://www.cnn.com1
ALLPOLmCS/1998/08/20/adultery.poll/ (Im visited Jan. 2, 2001); Bruce Handy, How J98
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and family values" have been the rallying cries of a movement to restore
traditional values in contemporary American society. 55 Why then, are
legislators and state judges, many of whom are elected, willing to take
actions that may be characterized as not supportive of family or marriage?56
What has changed in American law and American society that bas
caused the eradication of these torts? Is adultery no longer considered a
devastating injury to a spouse?57 Do socia.I mores and public policy no
longer support attempting to prevent people from interfering with exclusive
sexual relations in marriage? Aic the torts simply ineffective to redress the
in
jury or effect the public policy?
This article has two objectives. One is to examine what forces in law
and society brought about the demise of two well-established torts over a
sixty-five year period.sa Why did these old, established torts not embark on
new careers? The other objective is to suggest that, for jurisdictions that
have abrogated, or consider abrogating, criminal conversation and
alienation of affections, a modified tort of intentional interference with

Really FeelAboutFide/tty, 'nME, Aug. 31, 1998. 1.n a 1998 CNN/Time poll, eighty-six pe.rcent
(86%) responded that adultery was morally wrong, compared with seventy-six percent (76%) in
1977. AllPolitics, supra.
SS. See. e.g., Fraooes I!. Olsen, The Famtly and the Market: A Study ofIdeology and legal
Re/onn, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1497 (1983) (discussing "[a) n<:w round or debate . . .
regarding the family and family values''); Murphy, supra note 6, at 1112-14 (discussing
commentators' calls for "renewed anontion to 'morality' in family law").
S6. In the Idaho case abolishing criminal conversation, the Idaho Supreme Court took the
opportunity to pledge its commitment to marriage: "While this Court docs not condone adultery
and continues to hold marriage in the highest esteem, we are persuaded, for the reasons given,
that the action pursued by (plaintiff] docs not serve to protect the institution ofmarriage." Neal
v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 81S (Idaho 1994).
l injury
S1. 3 WJLUAM BLACKSTONF, CoMMENTARIES •140 (1768). Referring to the civi
aspect oradultery or criminal conversation, Blackstone said "(s]urely there can be no greater."

Id.

S8. In a more limited context, I anempt the inveru: o fwhat Professor Anita Bernstein did
in her article, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, supra note 4S, at 1544-59. Professor
Bernsteinexamined the characteristics of new torts that have succeeded in garnering general
recognition. Id. I examine what legal and social forces brought about the demise or two well·
established tori theories. It is: interesting to note that the cbaraC1eristics or successful tort
wannabes, ifapplied to criminal conversation and alienation ofaffections, would tend to predict
success, Bernstein posits that conservatism is the enemy oraspiring torts. Id. at 1543. Criminal
conversation and alienation oraffections seem to have a strong conservative base. The specific
characteristics that Bernstein identifies which favor recognition arc lacking novelty (being
grounded in common law rules), being less tort-like and more finnly rooted in contract and
property, and being portrayed as free or individual hwnan creation or sponsorship. Id. at
1544-59. The old torts or criminal conversation and alienation or affections can claim all of
those charac,teristics. Ironically, property and contract connections have proved detrimental to
the torts, fueling the powerful spouse-as-property criticism.
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marriage should be reco�ed. 59 Th� proposed modified tort is created
from elements selected frotn criminal conversation . and alienation of
affections. It gives the old torts a: new career.
In the final analysis, l am not sanguine about the longevity of criminal
conversation or alienation of affections in. the few jurisdictions that cling to
them. Nor am I optimistic about a groundswell of·support for the revised
interference with marriage tort offered herein as an alternative to the old
torts. First, the ideal of the marriage relationship with exclusive sexual
relations is not desired or valued by Americans as much as it is politically
Society recognizes that the
expedient for policymakers to say it is.
prevalent state · of affairs is ·the existence and tolerance of competitive
conduct (interference or attempted interference) by third parties that
·

59. In this sec9nd objective, I must face the uphill battle that Professor Bernstein describes
in How To Make a New Tort: Three Pqradoxes. Bernstein, supra note 45. Note, that I try to
avoid the damning characteristics (identified by Professor Bernstein) of novelty and individual

sponsorship by styling this. tort a ''modified" tort. My proposal to reconsider the old heart balm
torts is not, however, avant garde. Two scholars · who are sympathetic to feminist issues have
called for reconsideration of the other two, heart balm torts. . Professor .Jane Larson called for
recognition of a new tort of sexWtl fraud, drawing from· the old tort of seduction. Jane E.
Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit "'; A Feminist
Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COL{JM. L. REV. 374, 379. (1993). Although not proposing a new
tort, Professor Mary Goomb� revisits the role of feminists in advocating abolition of the tort of
breach of a promise to marry. Mary Coombs, .A.gency and Partnership: A Study of Breach of
Promise Plaintiffe, 2 YALE J.L. & F EMINISM 1 , 1 1.:17 (1989).
I do not argue· that the · other heart balm torts, breach of a promise to marry and seduction,
are worth· preserving or resurrecting. Those torts pose greater problems than alienation of
affections . and criminal conversatiQi:l, and they do . not serve as great a public purpose.
Feinsinger, supra note · 1 1, at 1008-()9. In. one of the earliest articles applauding the legislative
abrogations of the heart balm torts,' Professor Feinsinger recognized that distinctions could be·
drawn:
There will be little regret at the passing of the action for breach of promise to
marry. But there is room for an honest difference of opinion as to the actions
of alienation of affections and possibly of criminal conversation, which have
long been sanctioned as indemnifying private injury, preserving the family

unit and punishing publk: offen$Cs.
Id. at 1008;.see also HARi>ER ET AL, supra note 8, at 535 (questioning whether "all four actions
should be lumped together," and noting that breach-of-promise to marry is more likely
susceptible of improper use than is alienation of affections).
I think it is unfortunate that alienation of affections and criminal conversation became

inextricably intertwin.ed with breach of a promise to marry and seduction in the maligned
category of ''heart balm" torts. See Larson; ·supra note 59, at 394 n.85 (explaining that breach
of-promise to marry was. the primary target of the anti-heart balm movement). The first
legislation passed to abolisn heart balm torts; the Indiana Act of 1935, eliminated all of the torts
in one fell swoop, and that legislation served as the model for later legislation. See Feinsinger,
supra note 1 1, at 998-1008. Professor Kane, writing in 1936, noted that the one common
characteristic of these differe�t causes of action was "sexual misbehavior." Kane, supra note
42, at 65:
·
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challenges the exclusive intimacy of marriages. Second, the signature
features of American society are its free-market, capitalist economy and its
democratic government. The dominant aspects of this society have become
competition, libertarianism, and nd
i ividual autonomy and rights. Generally,
we like our markets, whether commercial or sexual relations, open and
i such a society, "interference torts" are not likely to be
competitive; n
favorcd.60 Third, the last century has seen an incremental shift in power
from males to females, with females finding a voice to express themselves
in society and law. Many women and female legal scholars have favored
the abolition of these torts because they treat women as inferior and
subordinate to men and as helpless victims of the power of men. It is not
clear to me that abolition of criminal conversation and alienation of
affections was in the best interest of women, or that continued
i the best interest of women. Nonetheless, I
nonrecognition of the torts is n
do not think that feminist scholars or politicians are likely to support
retention of the old torts or adoption of a revised tort. Perhaps I will be
surprised.
Part II of this article briefly discusses the historical roots of the torts of
criminal conversation and alienation of affections, their general acceptance
in the United States, and their eventual general rejection. Part III Slates the
reasons commonly articulated for abrogation of the torts and explains why
those reasons are generally unpersuasive. Part rv undertakes to explain the
changes n
i the context of evolving tort law and social values and morality.
The discussion in part rv provides a more cogent explanation for the
abolition of the torts than the reasons usually articulated. Part V presents
reasons for recognizing a revised tort theory of intentional interference with
marriage. Part VI describes the revised tort theory.

60. See Dobbs, supra noce 24, at 336; see also Paul D. Caning10n, A Senate ofFlvo: An
Essay on Sexuality andLaw, 23 GA. L. REv. 859, 869 (1989) (dcscn'bing the positions on legal

regulation of se< taken by his hypothetical "Sexual Libenarian Senator"-allowing individual
selection and "free flow" withttle
il
regula!ion-as "eongJUellt not ooly with capitalism, but also
with the political traditions of democracy, embracing both individual freedom and equal rights
to sclf-advancementj.
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II. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION AND ALIENATION OF
AFFECTIONS: AN ABRIDGED HISTORY

A. Pedigree

The laws of many societies throughout history have declared adultery to
be illegal and punishable. 61 Some other generalizations can: be made
regarding anCient civilizations' laws regarding adultery. A man was
permitted to kill the seducer of his wife with no legal repercussions for
himself. 62 Also, married women who committed adultery were treated
more harshly than married men: who committed adultery. 63 Moreover, the
punishments meted out were often gruesome and barbaric, such as the
mutilation of the adulteress or the devouring of her by dogs. 64 Some
punishments were intended publicly to disgrace the adulteress, such as the
infamous "running of the gauntlet" in the nude or semi-nude. 65 The reasons
6 1 . See generally Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Laws on Adultery-A Synopsis, 1 J. FAM. L.
89 (1961).
62. In many societies throughout history, the law excused killings under such
circumstances, although some required a discovery such as that described in the hypothetical at
the beginning of this article-adulterers engaged in jlagrante delicto. For example, in England
in the ninth century, the laws of Alfred the Great provided that a man could fight without
becoming liable to vendetta if he caught another man engaged in sexual relations with his wife,
daughter, sister, or mother. Alfred 43 § 7 (cited in TuE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH
KINGS 85 (F.L. Attenborough ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1963) (1922)); Murray, supra note 61,
at 99-100 (noting that under the laws of William I, although the state was prohibited from
inflicting death for adultery, the husband (and father and son) were permitted to do so,
apparently on the rationale that "[a]ggrieved husbands were going to kill the parties no matter
what the law prohibited"); see also JEAN BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAw 139
(Augustus M . Kelley 1968) (1912) (noting that, "[ i]n the latest stage of the law," a husband lost
the right to kill his wife if he catches her in the act, although it was not too difficult to obtain a
pardon if he carried out the execution).
63. BRISSAUD, supra note 62, at 139-40 ("Civil legislation never treated adultery of the
husband as it did that of the wife.") ; Murray, supra note 61, at 89 ("The man paid a fine and the
woman was burned alive.").
64. Murray, supra note 6 1 , at 92-93, 95. The laws of Manu are particularly gruesome for
both the adulterous spouse and the partner:.
If a woman made insolent by (the rank of) her family, or by (her own)
parts (beauty, wealth, etc. ,) should prove false to her husband, the king
shoul.d have her devoured by dogs in some much-frequented place.
He should cause the evil man to be burned on a glowing hot iron couch,
and they shall place pieces of wood about it till the evil-doer is consumed.
Id. at 95-96 (citing HOPKINS, THE ORDINANCES OF MANU VII-XIVII, at 237 (1891)).
65. BRISSAUD, supra note 62, at 137-38 n.7; Murray, supra note 61, at 103; see also Jacob
Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REY. 65 1, 654 n. 19 (1930). Writing
·

about the running of the gauntlet penalty for adultery, Brissaud notes that "it turned into the
obscene and burlesque, so much so that the penalty was more scandalous than the offense
itself." BRISSAUD, supra note 62, at 137-38.
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for the illegality and the harsh punishments differ with different societies
and periods of history, but several major reasons can be identified: sin,
bastardization of family line, destruction of unity of the family, and
violation of a man's property right. M One commentator suggests that
common to all societies that declared adultery illegal was the notion that
adultery is an affront to a man's pride, being forced to recognize that
another man is sexually superior and thus is able to lure away the cuckold's
wife.67 The history of legal treatment of adultery has not been a proud one,
i flicted on the spouse and,
but it does attest to the seriousness of the injury n
pemaps, the society.
The immediate historical roots of the American torts of alienation of
affections and criminal conversation are in seventeenth century English law.
Although alienation ofaffections was not recognized in England, it is of the
lineage of the tort of seduction or enticing away of a servant.61 Blackstone
enumerated three causes of action that a husband might bring for injuries
relating to his interests in his wife: abduction or taking away of the wife,
adultery or criminal conversation, and beating or otherwise abusing the
wife.69 The basis of the torts in England is traced 10 the rule, recognized at
least by the thirteenth century, that a master could recover from a person
who beat or otherwise injured his servant or apprcntice.10 There were three
features of the action: I) violence had 10 be used against the servant; 2) the
action was for the loss of the service, and was distinct from the action given
10 the injured servant for his injury; and 3) there was not a requirement of a
contract between a master and servant-the action was given because there
was a state of service, and the service was lost due 10 injury. 71
66. Mwny, supra nOle 61, at 89. One of the reuons, bastardization or WlClenainty
regarding pa1emi1y, explains in pan why adultery by a wife was considered worse and was
treated more hanhly; WlClCRainty regarding paternity could rcaull in family property pas.sing to
strangers. 81USSAVD, supra noll: 62. at 140; Lippman, supra note 65. al 655.
67. Mwny, supra DOie 61, at 89.
68. IWtPER ET AL, supra DOil: 8, &I 504 (''Today few would regard the "lbduc:tion' or
'COi
ic
rn
a
u' of a wife as a trespass ag&ns:! the husband oo the theory that the wife is incapable
of giving consent or oo any theory that the husband bas a 'properly intcnst' in htt body. The
usual actioo in manyjurisdictions is for alienation ofaffections ofeither spou5t:
"); Gregory
L. Thompson. NOie, �Suit ofAliaiation ofAfftt:lions: Can Its E:rutf'lfll Be JUJjitd
ti
Today?,
S6N.D. L. REY. 239, 241 (1980 )(explaining that the ion of abduction, based oo the husband's
proprietaJy interest in his wife, became unacccpcable in America and was replacedby 1bc ion of
alienation ofafTec1ioo.s).
69. 3 BLACKSTON!', supra noll: 57, at •t39; QuiM v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 334 n.11
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (citing 81..ACKSTON:E's COMMEHTAIUE)S .
70. Dobbs,supra DOil: 24, at 338; Lippman, supra DOie 65, at 653.
ilh Social Relations, 21 Av.. L. JlEv. 764, 765-66
71. John H. Wiporc, Interference ll'
(1887).
•

•

•

•

1004

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St L.J.

In 1350, the Ordinance of Labourers was enacted in England in response
to labor shortages resulting from a great plague. The ordinance bound
laborers, free and bound, to reman
i in the service to which they were bound,
and imposed a jail sentence on a laborer for a violation. The ordinance also
created a remedy for the employer against any person who received and
retained a servant. This statutory action, unlike the common law action,
required ru1 express contract to serve for a definite term. 72 Thereafter, the
7
two actions, common law and statutory, became mixed. 3 The action for
trespass on a wife developed separately from an action de trespass facra
feminre, which was brought jointly by husband and wife.74 However, the
loss of service doctrine, first recognized in the context of masters and
servants, came to be applied to the husband-wife relationship so that a
husband had an action for the loss, through violence, of bis wife's
consortium. 75 The next extension was to permit recovery when the loss of
consortium was due to enticement rather than an act of violence perpetrated
on the wife, although there was no supporting precedent for such
recovery.76 The English cases did not recognize an action for simple
alienation of affections; rather, the injury was that the wife was enticed to
leave her husband's home.n
Finally, with the different doctrines and statutes rcgardina recovery for
loss of services by a servant mixing and merging, the requirement of
violence was lost, and the term "servant" was enlarged from its original
meaning. These developments led to the recognition of a broad new
that interference by
principle of contract law in 1853 in Lumley v.
persuasion with any contractual relationship was actionable.19

Gye71

Id. at 766.
73. Id. at 766-67; see also Note, Torrlous Interference with Contractual Relations in the
Ninetttnth �ntury: The TNlnsformat/on ofProperty. Contract. and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV.
ISIO, !SIS o.22 (1980) (noting that statutory causes of action were incorporated into the
common law by the end ofthe 18th century).
74. Wigmore, supra oote 71, at 769.
75. Id. Modem characterizations of criminal conversatioo u having been based oo
recognition of a husband's property interest Ui his wife are correct. See, e.g., 8 'MLLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY Of' ENGLISH LAW 430 (1925) (''The husband's interest in bis wife's
consortium, unlike the parent's n
i terest in the consortium of his children, wu coosidcred 10 be
sufficiently proprietary to support an action of trespass."); see also Lippmal\ s11pra note 6S, at
651-73 (discussing the property basis forthe tort).
76. Wigmore, supra note 71, at 769 (citing Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes 5n, 125 Eng.
Rep. 1330 (1745)); see also Fcinsinger, supra OOle 11, at 992 (citing Winsmore).
77. Feinsinger,supro OOIC ll,at992 n.7S.
78. 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
79. Wigmore,supra ootc 71, at 770; sec also Note, supra oote 73, at 1522-24 (discussing
the three ways in which Lumley ''transfooncd" the p11>cxisiring law ofthird-party interference).
72.

33:0985]

TWO OLD TORTS LOOKING FOR A NEW CAREER

I005

B. Acceptance
The husband's right of action was recognized early n
i the United Sttates80
in all states except Louisiana, which did not recognize either criminal
conversation or alienation of affections.11 The Married Women's Property
Acts were passed, giving women a number of rights, including rights to
retain earnings, own property, and bring suit on their own bebalf.12 The
80. New York was the 61$1 stale lO reeollJliu the tort of alienation of 1ffections n
i
lleennaoce v. James, 47 Barb. 120 {N.Y. Oen. Tenn 1866). Stt, t.g. . PROSSER, supra llOIC 7,

i alienotion of
§ 124, at 918 n.29 (citina Httrmanc• as first case in the United States to recognze
affections); ste also Kavantgh. supra note 26, at 328 (same).
81. This s
i only pan.ially correct. The LouisiaM Supremo Court definitively rojec•cd the
theory of alienation of affections in 1927. Moulin v. Monteleone, I IS So. 447 (La. 1927).
However, a panel of the court had appea�d 10 recognize such o right of �covery n
i 1924.
Hennessey v. Wahloa, 99 So. 40S (ta. 1924). In fltnnusry, the plainti!I' brouaht an action
wbeii bis wife's parents alleaedly abducled her, detained her, and alienated her 1ffections
ioward lier husband, and dmied plaintilT acceu 10 his wife. The maniqc occurred after
pl»ntiff and !us flllCC
lC eloped. Citina Civi
l Code Article 231 s OD cklictual liability, the COWi
staled as follows:
[TJhe hust.nd 11 legally entitled to the possession and society or his wife,
and lO her lid and assisw>ce. as Iona. u he complies ,.;th the obligations
arising from the contract of rrwriage.
Any Invasion or such marital rights, whether by the father or �"' mother
ofthe wife. or by a third penon, withoutju.11 or reasonable cause, necessarily
i poses upon the
coiutirutes an 1c1 �suiting in damages 10 him, and m

aespasser, by whose rau11 it happened, lhc obligation or� the n
i jwy.
Id. &1406 (ciuotion omitled).
When the Lowsiant Supreme Coon decided Mou/111 lbou1 tbtcc years Ja1er, it re)CCud the
idea thn &II action for abenation ofalfcclions cvo; had been recognized in the state. Reaarchng
HDflltSUY, ftnl, the ooun made the dubious distinction lhlt the cause of action OD which the
Hennasey court allowed �ery was slander, not •h�111tion of affections. Second, 1hc ooun
noledthat, �ardless of whit Hennusey held, it was not binding on the Moulin coun because it
was decided dwing a brief period of time when the six-member Louisiana Supreme Coun was
divided inio two sections of �ejustice; each. Moreover, of the �e justices who decided the
case, one was serving temporarily, and another was no longer on the court al the t
ime Moulin
was decided.
The Moulin coun gave four reasons for not recognizing an aclion for alienation of affections
• a time when a majority or staia did recogniu it First, damages for alienation of affections
are punitive or exemplary, and Louisiana law does not authorize awarding punitive damages in
civil actions. Moufl1t, I IS So. at 448. Second, Louisiana's Civi
l Code declared maniaae 10 be a
civil connect, and Louisiana law did not (and except in limited cilClllllSlanCe still does DOI)
rec:ogni:ze a cause or action for third-pany interfercnoe with a contrac1. Id. at 449. Third. under
Louisiana law, a husband had no propeny inte�st in the companionship, services, or dfections
ofhis wife. Id. at 4Sl. Finally, Article 2294 ofthe Code of 1825, the precursor of Article 23 IS,
would not suppon such an action because it was. subject to the constructions and limitations of
the jurisprudence or Rome and France, and, the court asscned, "[ijt is cenain that unckr the
Roman and Spanish laws, there was no right ofaction for alienation of a wife's affeclions." Id.
82. Olsen, !IUpra note SS, at 1531; Paul Davis FinCher, Note. To Have a11d Nor Hold:
Applying tM Disco•'O')' Rule to loss ofC01Uortium Claf,,,. Stemmingfrom Prtmoritol, Lattnt
ltrjurtts, S3 VAND. I.. R£v. 685, 692 (2000). Professor Frances Olsen has cb.aracmized this
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passage of the acts required courts to do one of three things regarding
alienation of affections and criminal conversation: hold that the husband's
right to his wife's services was obsolete; hold that a wife had an equal right
to the services of her husband; or ignore the historical basis of the rights of
Sl
action and extend them to women "on the theory of equality." Most states
recognized a wife's right of action. 84 The Indiana Supreme Court, for
example, reasoned that the common law did give wives a cause of action for
alienation of affections, but, due to the legal fiction that the husband and
wife were one, the wife was procedurally prevented from asserting the
ss
cause.
The court insisted upon legal recognition of the cause of action of
the wife:

If there s
i any such thing as legal truth and legal right, a wronged
i such a case as this, for in all the long
wife may have her action n

category of human rights there is no clearer right than that of a
wife to her husband's support, society, and affection. An invasion
of that right is a flagrant wrong, and it would be a stinging and
bitter reproach to the law if there were no remedy.86

The reasoning of procedural incapacity was criticized by at least one
commentator as being "incredible" because it ignored the fact that the basis
That commentator
for the Incapacity was the woman's inferiority. 87
described the theoretical basis for the extension as follows: "The historical
basis of these actions-loss of services-has collapsed and a new one,
88
Thus, one
violation of inherent marital rights, has been substituted."
could argue that, in Holmes' terms, alienation of affections and criminal
89
conversation had embarked upon their new careers.
change n
l y more like !he market. Although she
i !he law as an attempt to make !he fami
evaluates the acts as undermining !he male-dominated hierarchy of the family, she also socs
!hem as "detrimental to women," because they also undermined !be altruistic elhic of !he family
and !bus left women open to the type of domination that prevails in the market. Olsen, supra
note SS, at JS3J-32.
83. Lippman, supra note 65, at 662.
84. Brown, supra note 11, at 476 (stating that "overwhelming wcigJ11 of aulhority"
recognized that Married Women's Propeny Acts removed a legal disability, thus giving women
right to maintain a right of action for alienation of affection); Feinsinger, supra note 11, at
992-93. See also Lippman, supra note 65, at 662-66.
8S. Haynes v. Nowlin, 29 N.E. 389, 389-90 (Ind. 1891); see also Gray v. Gee, 39 T.L.R
429, 431 (K.B. 1923) (recognizing that wife always had substantive right to consortium, but was
prevented from bringing action by procedural disability prior to !he enactment of !he Married
Women's Propeny Act of 1882).
86. Haynes, 29 N.E. at 389.
87. Lippman, supra note 65, at 664.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 672 ("[O)ur marital law is !he outcome of rules of contract combined with
Christian ideology and modified by !he historical process which Judge Holmes describes.").
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Some states, however, were reluctant to recognize such an action for
women. The Minnesota court, for example, reasoned that the action should
not be extended for several reasons: the principal reason for recognizing an
action for men, the possibility of illegitimate offspring was not present for a
wife; a wife suffers no disgrace when her husband commits adultery; and a
woman who would be a defendant in a wife's action probably would not be
90
The Wisconsin court refused to extend the action because it
the seducer.
feared a great increase in such lawsuits if wives were permitted to sue.
Moreover, the court reasoned, men, being men, involved in daily social
intercourse, can be expected to give in to temptation occasionally, whereas
women,

who
91
temptations.

are

busy

with

household

chores,

do

not

face

such

C. Rejection

Indiana became the first state to abolish legislatively alienation of
92
affections and criminal conversation.
The Indiana act, entitled "An Act to
93
promote public morals," abolished all of the heart balm torts, including
breach of a promise to marry and seduction of a female over the age of
twenty-one. Notwithstanding the misogynistic rhetoric, such as references
94
to "gold diggers," used to support anti-heart balm legislation, many of the
95
leaders of the efforts were women.
For example, the Indiana legislation
was spearheaded by Roberta West Nicholson, the only female member of
96
This period of time, the first "Sexual Revolution,"
the Indiana legislature.
90. Kroessin v. Keller, 62 N.W. 438, 438-39 (Minn. 1895).
91. Duffies v. Duffies, 45 N.W. 522, 525 (Wis. 1890). For a nearly contemptuous
treatment of the Wisconsin court's reasoning, see Brown, supra note 11, at 477 ("To comment
upon this alleged reasoning would be impossible without approaching contempt of court.").
92. 1935 Ind. Acts, ch. 208 § 1 (codified at IND. CODE. ANN. § 2-508 (Bums 1946
replacement volume)).
93. Id.
94. Larson, supra note 59, at 397; see also Coombs, supra note 59, at 12-17 (discussing
the desire of feminists and womens' groups to abolish heart balm legislation). For writing of
that time by a female academician, see Harriet Spiller Daggett, The Action for Breach of the
Marriage Promise, in LEGAL ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 39, 92 (1935) (describing plaintiffs in
majority of breach of promise actions as "unscrupulous women fortune hunters").
95. Coombs, supra note 59, at 12 (recounting that women sponsored the anti-heart balm
bills in Indiana, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Ohio); Larson, supra note 59, at 397 n.93
(discussing women's sponsorship of bills in Indiana, Maryland, and Nebraska).
96. Aching Hearts Are Itching Palms, Says Woman Legislator as Men Gallantly Pass
"Love Bill,
INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Feb. l , 1935, at 1 [hereinafter Aching Hearts] .
Mrs.
Nicholson was a daughter-in-law of Meredith Nicholson, who was a famous Indiana writer and
United States ambassador to Venezuela. Time magazine, reporting on Ms. Nicholson's
legislative efforts in support of the legislation included a photograph of Ms. Nicholson reading
"

1008

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St L.J.

was marked by a reaction against the sexual repression of women and the
Stereotyping of the ideal woman as sexually passive and modest. 97 Laws
and symbols that fit with the Victorian ideal of women bad to go, as women
struggled to assen their individuality and autonomy. 98 Thus, women argued
against laws that gave them distinctive protections, asserting that they
wanted 110 special rights and wanted to be treated in the same way as men.

For example, speaking to the Indiana legislature in support of the first anti

hcart balm bill, Roberta West Nicholson said, "Women do not demand
rights, gentlemen, they cam them, and they ask no such privileges as these
101
which arc aboli.shed in this bill."99 Illinois1
00 and New York also enacted
i 1935. Although the anti-bean balm campaign
anti-heart balm legislation n
got offto a fast start with twenty-three states considering bills in 1935, only
eight states passed such legislation before 1950. 101 In the 1970s, there was
another wave of legislation and some court decisions abolishing criminal
conversation and alienation of affections.10J
Several points arc worth mentioning about the first wave of the anti-heart
balm movement First, the withering academic criticism that set the stage
for the legislative actions was directed at only one of the hean balm torts-
that was breach of the promise to marry. 104 The banle cry1oi of the bean
balm abolitionists in legislative halls and the media that fortune-seeking
women were using hcart balm torts to blackmail men was primarily about
real or fictional breach of ·promise plainriffs.106 Second, a point which
IO her IWO children. Nallonal Afloln: Womtrt-Lhw v. Extortion, 1lME, Feb. 18, 1935, II 16.
The Tim• anicle described her u, "handsome yoana Mts. Nicboboo, 1e11 years manied and
molber oftwo."
97. Lanon, "'f"O DOie S9, at 398-99.
98. Id.; Coombs, supra note 59, at 14 ("ror femini51 women, I 111gccn, the (brucll of
promise) cause of action was pem:ived u an icleological impedimau to woman's social
progress . . . ."); stt also Rebecca Tusbnet, Note, R.ula ofEngagtm1nJ, 107 YALE L. J. 2583,
2S87 (1998) ("Feminists also expressed coocern that the actions ensconced marriage u the
epitome of 1 woman's cxistcnu and encouraged women 10 use lllC'D for ecooomic benefits
ratbet lhan to mec1 lbem on equal 1erms.").
99. Aching /{torts, supra OOIC 96, II I, 9.
100. 193S m. Laws 716; ILL COMP. STAT. 40/1901-07 (193S).
101. 1935 N.Y. Laws 263 (193S) (amending lbe CiYl
l Practice Act by ldding §§ 61-a to
61-i.)
102. Larson, SllJml DOie S9, at 396n.92.
103. M.B.W. Sinclair, Stdvctfon and the Myth ofthe ldtal ll'oman, S lAW & L'OEQ. J. 33,
96-97 (1987).
104. Larson, S11pra noie 59, a1 394 n.8S (citins anic:les).
IOS. Professor Kane articulated ii IS the •l"P" "h's 1 mdcci." Kane, supra note 42, at 66.
106. Id.; Coombs, supra note 59, al 12· 13. Professor Coombs tracq the image of the
fommc-huntins woman to two popular women writen of the lime, Anill Loos, who wrote the
best-seller Gendemen Pre/tr 8/0lldtJ, and Dorochy Dunbar Bromley. Id. Professor Larson
desicn"bes lbe shift in public opinion IS follows: "In the early IWentieth centwy, the
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intersects with the preceding point, the din about use of the heart balm torts
for purposes ofblackmail and extortion was not well substantiated. 107 Third,
the academic writing of the time did not unifonnly praise the le slative
efforts to abolish criminal conversation and alienation of affection
s.1
After the first wave of the 1930s, there was little critical re-examination
of the movement to abolish criminal conversation and alienation of
affections. A second wave of legislative enactments began in the 1970s. 109
The movement again was buoyed by feminist successes and "the dramatic
change in the conception of women" as autonomous, active individuals,
who were not mere companions to men, and consequently easy victims. 110
The reasons for abolition of the torts cited in the 1930s were recited again.
Writing in 1972, a commentator stated that a "numerical majority of states"
still recognized the tons. 1 1 1 A commentator writing nine years later stated
that thirty states and the District of Columbia bad abolished or limited the
action for alienation of affections, and twenty-two states and the District of
Columbia had taken similar action regarding criminal conversation. 112 As
discussed above, no more than nine states now recognize alienation of
113
affections or criminal conversation.
In sbon, the movement to abolish
criminal conversation and alienation of affections was not a great success in

�

condcmnalion of mile sc�ual l&gre$Sion that had 1bapcd earlier public opinion began IO wane,

and mile dcfcndanis were increasinaly perceived as innocent wgeis of schmllna and

bypocntx:al blac\:niailcrs."

Larson, S1l/Jl'O note 59, at 393.
107. Feinsinger,svpra note 11, at 1008-09; Kmc, Sllpra note 42, at 6�7.
108. E.g.:
Tbm will bettle
il
ream at the pauing ofthe action for biucl! ofpromise tO
many. But there is room for an honest difference of opinion as to the actions
ofalienation of affections and possibly of criminal converntion, which have
long been sanctioned as indemnifying private n
i jury, preserving the family
unit and punishing public offctl$t&
Fcinsinger, nipro note ll, at 1008;
Wi1h all 1u fimlu, then, the action for alienation of affections is on the whole
desirable, and while it should no doubt be aomcwhat limited, such limitations
should I)()( be pcnni1ted to diminish the dc$irable effect which the possibility
of lilbility in this ection now bas in di$couragjng the intentional breaking up
ofhomes.
Brown, supra note 11, at 506; see also !Une,.rupro note 42, at 65·72.
109. Sinclair, supra note 103, at 97.
1 10. Id.; I.anon, St<Pra l)(l(e 59, at 400.
111. William M. Kelly, Note, � Casefor Retmtion of Cawrs ofAcJion for lntenlWnal
/nteeference With 71te Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 426, 429(1972).
112. Kavanagh,supra note 26, at 330-31.
113. S«supra�1.
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The sustained effort, over a sixty-five year period,
the first wave.
however, has been quite successful.
D. After the Fall

They just will not go away quietly. The abrogation of criminal
conversation and alienation of affections in most states has not spelled the
end of civil lawsuits based on adultery. Now the claims are pursued under
collateral tort theories-most commonly intentional infliction of emotional
1 15
Some claims are pursued under the rubric of professional
distress.
6
malpractice when the third-party paramour is a clergyman, 1 1 lawyer,
11
doctor, 7 etc.
Another approach is that taken in Neal v. Neal. 1 1 8 The wife sued both
her husband and his partner. The court announced that Idaho no longer
recognized the theory of criminal conversation, but it struggled with the
plaintiff s battery claim against her husband. The plaintiffs argument was
that she had sexual relations with her husband not knowing that he had
engaged in extramarital sex, and that had she known of his affair, she would
11
not have consented to having sex with him. 9 Thus, the wife argued that
sexual relations with her husband was an offensive contact, and her consent
was ineffective because it was obtained by fraud-the husband's failure to
disclose a material fact. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of
the battery claim, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact on
the issue of consent. 120
In South Carolina, which legislatively abolished both criminal
conversation and alienation of affections, a husband joined his wife's
paramour as a partner in his divorce action on the ground of adultery. 1 2 1
The family court held the wife's lover jointly and severally liable for the
husband's attorney fees. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the
1 1 4. Larson, supra note 59, at 396 n.92 (describing the anti-heart balm movement as "by no
means uniformly successful" before 1950).
1 1 5. See, e.g., Osborne v. Payne, 3 1 S.W.3d 9 1 1 (Ky. 2000) (former husband bringing
action against priest to whom husband and wife went for counseling); Scamardo v. Dunaway,
694 So. 2d 1 04 1 (La. Ct. App. 1 997) (husband suing doctor who was treating his wife); Quinn
v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (alleging that defendant engaged in open and
notorious affair with plaintiffs wife with intent to injure plaintiff).
1 1 6. See, e.g. , Cherepski v. Walker, S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1 996); Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d
1 12 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 995).
1 1 7. See, e.g. , Nicholson v. Han, 1 62 N.W.2d 3 1 3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1 968).
1 1 8. 873 P.2d 8 7 1 (Idaho 1994).
1 1 9. Id. at 876.
1 20. Id. at 877.
1 2 1 . Heape v. Heape, 5 1 7 S.E.2d 1, 1-3 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999).
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family court' s decision was tantamount to a "quasi-revival of the torts of
22

criminal conversation and alienation of affection." 1

Courts want the claims to go away, and they often dismiss them as
repackaged versions of criminal conversation or alienation of affections,
23
which have been legislatively abolished. 1
For example, a Massachusetts
appellate court rejected a claim that a defendant ' s engaging in an adulterous
affair with plaintiff s wife that allegedly became known to plaintiff, his son,
and the community at large constituted intentional infliction of emotional
24
distress. 1
The court stated as follows: "An affair of the sort alleged here
would by most in our society be considered reprehensible and a cause for
sadness, anger and distress; we do not condone the behavior which is
25
The court then went on to say, however, that such conduct
alleged . . . . " 1
26
is not outrageous and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. 1
The obstinance and tenacity of plaintiffs in bringing these lawsuits,
notwithstanding the general

abrogation of criminal

conversation

and

alienation of affections, is instructive in considering the role of tort law.
Plaintiffs are being injured, and they want to pursue a legal remedy. If tort
law does not provide a means of civil redress, it is incumbent on members
of the legal profession to articulate cogent reasons for the decision. I do not
think most of the reasons articulated thus far are adequate to deny relief for
27
so great a harm and so great a wrong. 1

122. Id. at 3 .
123. See, e.g., Quinn v . Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 333 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); Nicholson v.
Han, 162 N. W.2d 3 1 3 , 3 1 7 {Mich. Ct App. 1968). In a California case, a former husband sued
his former wife for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the following facts: during
marriage, wife had extramarital relationship out of which daughter was born, but wife did not
tell husband that daughter was not his biological child until dissolution of marriage when
husband sought custody of daughter. Steve H. v. Wendy S., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90, 9 1 -92 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997). The appellate court held that permitting an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim on these facts would contravene the policy underlying California's abolition of
the heart balm torts. Id. at 95-96.
1 24. Quinn, 732 N.E.2d at 330.
1 25. Id. at 3 39.

126

.

Id.

1 27 . One of the most eloquent statements of this concern is in a leading treatise on tort law
by Professors Harper, James, and Gray, in which they question the wisdom of complete
abrogation of the torts:
Undoubtedly the actions in question have been subjected to abuses. What is
doubtful, however, is the wisdom of meeting such abuses by complete
abolition of all remedies . . . . It may well be that limitation on damages and
certain procedural reforms would have met the problem more satisfactorily
than complete abolition.

Particularly in the case of alienation, grievous

wrongs are suffered and some of life's most important interests ruthlessly
invaded. To abolish all remedy in such cases is certainly subject to serious
question.
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Ill. CRITIQUE OF REASONS GIVEN FOR ABOLISHING CRJMINAL
CONVERSATION AND ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS

It is possible, and perhaps even to be expected, that the reasons given for
abrogating these two tort theories would change over a sixty-five year
period. Yet, the reasons given by commentators, courts, and legislators
8
have remained largely the same. 12

A. The Great Potentialfor Abuse/Extortion
These torts are particularly susceptible to the abuse of extortion and
blackmail. This is the grandparent of all the reasons-the one that was
given in support of the initial legislative efforts.129 First, as discussed
above, tbe theory of recovery for which abolitionists cited this reason was
breach of a romise to marry, not criminal conversation or alienation of
affections. 1
Notwithstanding that fact, it was and, remarkably, still is
131
given as a reason for abrogating alienation and criminal conversation.
There were in the early 1900s newspaper accounts and a few cases

iJ'

mentioning breach of promise actions that were described as blackmail.132
One writer, however, characterized those depictions as being driven by
"misogynistic backlash" to the Sexual Revolution, based on a fear of
less of the reason for the
women's newfound assertiveness. 133 R ard
a
s
well as commentators in the
"blackmail" scare, modem commentator
s1
t930s135 have observed that there was no effort to substantiate the
disproportionate use of the heart balm torts, in comparison with other tort
theories, for purposes of extortion. One commentator writing in the 1930s
argued that there were other rights of action which were at least as

�

HARrER ET Al., supra note 8, al 534-35.

128. For other critiques ofthe reasons, see Kelly, supra note 111, at 429-33, and Jones,
supranote 40, at 71-84. Some ofmy critique repeals some oftheirs.
129. See supra note 106 and accompanying lext.
130. See supra notes I04-I08 and accompanying text.

I3I. See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 87I, 875 (Idaho 1994).
I32. Coombs, supra note 59, al I5-16.
I33. Larson, supra note 59, al 398-99.
I34. Larson, supra note 59, at 395 n.91; Jones, supra note 40, al 73-74; Kelly, supra !lOle
I II, at 430.
I35. Feinsinger, supra note 11, at I008-09 (stating that "newspaper emphasis has created
an illusion of universality as to the evils of unfounded actions, coercive settlements or excessi,•e
verdicts"); Kane, supra note 42, at 66 ("[f)bere was some justification for the resentment over
the abuse of . . . breach of promise to many, but we may seriously doubt whether these abuses
were as universal or as ineradicable as to necessitate the wholesale abolition of established
rights andremedies.").
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HUsceptible of abuse as the heart balm torts. 1 36 In the end, the most that can
he said in support of this reason is that one may intuitively think that it is
true because of the great embarrassment that may be associated with sexual
misconduct and the publicity that such conduct will generate. 1 37 Given the
prevalence of adultery in contemporary society, however, it is fair to
ttuestion whether a potential defendant would fear the stigma and
ostracization that may have resulted during an earlier period. In summary,
this is a reason for not recognizing alienation of affections and criminal
conversation that was dubious when given in the 1 930s and is wholly
incredible now.
B. Archaic Torts Because They Treat Married Women As
Property of Their Husbands

Criminal conversation and alienation of affections should be abandoned
because they are based on the archaic notion that a husband has a property
interest in his wife. This reason is often articulated by courts 1 38 and
commentators. 139 It certainly has a basis in history. 1 40 The dramatic
expansion of the third-party interference torts in 1 853 in Lumley v. Gye has
1 1
been explained as the creation of a new type of property--contract rights. 4
Before that general recognition of interference torts, the property interest of
the plaintiff was grounded in the status relationship rather than the
contractual rights. 142 One response to this is to argue that although the
historical basis of the torts was the proprietary interest of the husband in his
wife's body and services, this basis was purged when the rights of action
were extended to women. Professor Chamallas notes that when loss of
consortium claims were extended to women, they lost their property-like
features, and in their new sentimental and nonproprietary form, they lost
their favored status among torts. 143 It is tempting to argue that, like loss of
consortium claims, criminal conversation and alienation of . affections lost
their property basis when the rights of action were extended to women.
But, the argument goes too far. There is still a property element to the
136. Kane, supra note 42, at 67.
137. Larson, supra note 59, at 395 n.91.

138. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994).
139. Chamallas, supra note 5, at 341 (rejecting the torts in which "the wife is treated as the
property of the husband and the marriage is organized primarily to serve the husband's sexual
and emo tional needs"); McDouga� supra note 32, at 181.
140. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
141. Note, supra note 73, at 1520.
142. Id.
143. Chamallas, supra note 48, at 528.
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torts. 144 Indeed, one .commentator .argued that criminal conversation and
alienation .of affections are property-based ,because · changes in the
relationship do not alter the rights; thus, he argued, the result of the Married
Women's Property Acts should have been extinction of the torts rather than
their extension to women. 14� There are property aspects of the torts even in
their current gender-neutral iterations: they do · tend to infringe on the
autonomy of a spouse who chooses to commit adultery, and they require
third parties to respect the right to exclusiye sexual relations-part of the
rights that "run" with tqe relationship�
It must be admitted that there still are property characteristics . of the
torts. Nonetheless, it is not clear why the mutual property interests in
relationships are as offensive as the former unilateral property interest in
body and services. Property in the feudal sense of ownership of tangibles is
not acceptable to desctjbe relationships between people; · property in that
' sense is far too limited for modem society. 146 . Such "new property" rights
based on relationships have not been considered as odious when applied to
people as the old property rights based on absolute ownership. 147 For
example, the plaintiff in a recent case sought to replace the property-based
rationale for criminal conversation with a marital . obligation of fidelity that
was recognized .by the domestic relations title of the Idaho Code. 148 Indeed,.
at least one comment.a.tor has called for a reconception of autonomy, so
valued by feminists, that rejects individualism and property and stresses the
importance of collectivis111 and rela#onships. 149

144. Dobbs, supra note 24, at'354-55 (describing legal status which the whole· world must
recognize as a form of property).
145. Lippman, supra note 65, at 659.
146. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, Tu:E NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); Laura s. Underkuftler, On
Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127 (1 990).
147. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal
Reasoning: The Example ofProperty in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 9 1 1 , 947 (1989).
A more communitarian social vision of property rights would start from the
assumption that property rights are almost always shared, rather than unitary,
and that they ordinarily are created in the context of relationships. This is
true in th� most important areas of social life, including the family, the
·
workplace, and housing.
Id. ; see also Green, Relational Interests, supra note 49, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 462 (distinguishing
relational interests from property).
148. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 87 1, 875 (Idaho 1994) (citing IDAHO CODE § 32·90 1). The
Idaho Supreme Court rejected plaintiff' s argument, reasoning that divorce is the exclusive
remedy for the breach of any duty imposed by that code section. Id.
149. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,
1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989).
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To 'State the argument as a call for abolition o f the torts based on their

historical roots is not to give it its full force.

One of the commentators

writing about the torts at the time of the first abolition movement effectively

refuted that version of the argument:

It is also urged that a consideration of the history of the action

shows that it has no proper place in our modem law . . . . It is . . .
argued that the wife's emancipation, which takes away the original
basis for both of these actions, should have resulted in their total
abolition. But this is an obvious

non

sequitur sirice the abolition

of the original basis for the action does not necessarily prove that
it has not still justification under modem conditions.

150

Professor Brown, after rej ecting the archaic basis argument, went on to

conclude that alienation of affections, despite faults and the need for

limitations, was still "on the whole desirable" for its effect of "discouraging

the intentional breaking up of homes." 1 5 1

·

Like Professor Brown, I rej ect the historical basis as an argument for

abolishing criminal conversation and alienation of affections.

I do,

however, recognize that there is still a property basis inherent in the torts,

and this merits examination. There are reciprocal property interests arising
out of the marital relationship.

good thing.

Some will consider this "new" property a

Others, including many feminists, will consider it bad and

argue that it still poses greater dangers to women than men.

Women' s

autonomy regarding their bodies, · including sexual and reproductive rights,

historically has been precarious, and remains controversial. Consequently, I

think it is more threatening for the law to say to a woman that she is limited
in a decision regarding sexual relations. 1 52 Much of this was probably

embodied in the words of Roberta West Nicholson when she said, "Women

do not demand rights, gentlemen, they earn them, and they ask no such
privileges as these which are abolished in this bill." 1 53 Although reasonable
people can disagree about how harmful to women are these property rights,
I argue that, on balance, the good for women and · society outweighs the
150. Brown,

supra note

1 1 , at 505;

see also Norton v. Macfarlane,

8 1 8 P.2d 8, 12

(Utah

1991) (stating that obsolete procedural and property theories once associated with alienation of

affections are uniformly rejected, but that does not mean tort is no longer useful).
1 5 1 . Brown, supra note 1 1 , at 506; see also Kelly, supra note 1 1 1 , at 43 1 ("Even though
the actions were originally designed to protect a fictive right and reflected a now-antiquated
view of the relation between the sexes, they have in the modem era taken on a very different

and worthwhile function-that of providing a remedy for injuries of a highly sensitive nature
while discouraging intentional disruptions of families.").
1 52. For an excellent discussion of feminist criticism of commodification of sex, see
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCl10N TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 230-36 (1 999).
153. Aching Hearts, supra note 96.
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harm to women from restricting their autonomy. First, although significant
progress bas been made toward economic equality between men and
women, it is still true that many manied women are, to a large extent,
financially dependent on their husbands. is.i Moreover, marital n
i stability
and divorce in many cases have a "more pronounced social and emotional
impact on women than on men ;us that is, middle-aged divorced men are
regarded more positively than are middle-aged divorced women, and the
market for sexual liaisons is better for the men. Thus, I think women may
derive substantial benefit from a relational n
i terest in marriage that carries
duties that must be respected by everyone. Second, I think that society
benefits from marriages that have duties of exclusive sexual relations, and a
communitarian perspective might require men and women to make some
sacrifices of individual autonomy for the good of society. 156
"

C.

Potential Tort Liability's Nondeterrence ofExtramarital Relations

A classic statement of this reason for abolishing the torts was given by

i not achieved; the nature of the
the Idaho Supreme Court: "Deterrence s
activities . . . that is sexual activity, arc not such that the risk of damages
would likely be a deterrent."157 This is a matter of opinion, and there is no

empirical evidence to support it Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the suivey
instrument and the polling techniques that would substantiate or refute this
speculation. 151 While I join Professor Carrington in claiming no expertise
i an equally plausible hypothesis that the
on the subject of sex, u9 I th.ink it s
.

154. Lenore J. Wcittman, 11re &:onom/cs o/Dlvorot: Social & Economic Constt1ut'nces of
Property. Alimony & Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1241-63 (1981).
155. Olsen, supra no1e SS, a1 l53S.
156. "Communiwiw believe thar oven . . . in a rights-conscious society, rights have
limits, and involve concomiwit responsibilities . . . . (They) suggested an agenda ro advance
commonly held social val\IC$ without unduly compromising n
i dividual righls." Ackt'rlllan,
supra note 47, at 6SO. Like Professor Ackerman, I am not a card-carrying communitarian, if
then: is such a card. Id. at 652 n.11, 6S4 n.29. I do think, however, that an appioach that
recognizes some limirations on nd
i ividual righ1s and autonomy for the good of society is, or
should be, an in1egral pan of relational tort theory. Ste generally William J. Woodward, Jr.,
Contrac1arians, Comm1111lty, andtire Tort ofInterference with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1103
(1996) (discussina the comm11nillWian approach to the "'lational tort of interference with
contract). Some feminist writers also have embraced a communirarian approach. See generally
Ncdelsky. supra note 149 (discussing communitarian reconceplUA!ization of autonomy and
contrastina that with liberalism's concept ofauronomy).
157. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994); see also Newton v. Hardy, 149 L.T.R.
165 (K.B. 1933) (slating that people merely "drift into a siruation" withoul considering the legal

implications).

158. See Jones, supra note 40, at 84 n.176.
159. Carringron, supra note 60, al 859.
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160
prospect of tort liability could dampen the fires of sexual passion.
Because the financial liability will be placed on the outsider, the deterrent
effect would be achieved by making the outsider less interested in the
married person, not vice versa. Given that the outsider is likely to have
other options that do not carry all the risks associated with the married
person, the additional risk of financial liability may deter the outsider.
Explaining another interference with relation tort, interference with
contractual relations in the context of employment contracts, Professor
Wonnell states d1at the objective of the tort is not to prevent the employees
from breaching their contracts, but ns
i tead to deter third parties from
interfering; that is, lhe potential tort liability decreases the value to the
prospective em loyer (potential interfering th.ird party) of the employee
i terference wilh marriage
under contract. 1 Thus, lhe tort of intentional n

�

would help narrow the market for the spouse considering extramarital
relations.
While I do not argue !hat deterrence of interference is a sufficient ground
for the torts, that speculative effect seems to me as likely as the converse.

D. The Uiw Should Not Attempt to "Legislate" Morality
Occasionally, a critic will say that the law should not attempt to legislate
morality. 162 This reason merits little attention. As one commentator has

�

stated, ''( t is absurd to suggest that th.e law bears no relationship to
morality." 61 Law will deal with issues of morality, but not eveey moral
standard orjudgment will be translated into law.16'
The criticism about legislating morality may harbor a narrower objection
that the law seldom should restrict the consensual sexual activities of
adults. 165 Perhaps that was the view of the attorney who disdainfully
reacted to the Hutelmyer case on a television show: "Family values, this is

160.Id. at 887 ("How sexually attractive, the Tory wonders, would be an available pannct
whose embrace was accompanied by a wage and bank llCCOUltl gamWuncntT').
161. Christopher T. Wonnell, 111• Conrracrua/ Disempowennenr ofEmployus, 46 STAN. L
REV. 87, 96 (1993).
162. McDougal, supra noce 32, at 163.
163. Ackennan, supra note 47, at 661.
164. The classic example is whether law should impose a duty to r=ue. See generally
Heyman, supra note 47.
I6S. Michael E. Malamut, Proposal for Re>uion ofArchaic Statutes Implicating Private
Consensual Noncommercial Adult Sexual Conducr, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 4S, 66 (1993)
(discussing criminal law, says "laws agains1fornication and adultcty ""' primarily aimed at
preserving a moral order in which maniage is the only appropriate relatiomhlp for sexual
expression").
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really absurd, I mean, if it was the law of New York, could �ou imagine?
This whole city would be, like, at the courthouse all the time." 66
Law, throughout history, has regulated sexual conduct. 167 This should
not be surprising in view of the fact that sexual mores are pivotal to our
society and community. 168 Moreover, as Professor Carrington points out,
sexual conduct has as much effect on nonpartici�ts, often including
children, and society as do employment relations. 69 Given that sexual
conduct has often pronounced effects on others and on society, it s
i not
surprising that the law will regulate it. The law also will leave some aspects
i not whether
of sexual conduct unregulated. Thus, the issue to be debated s
law will regulate sexual conduct, but how law will regulate it.

E. /nta11gible and Speculative Damages that are Subject to Prejudice/

Unseemliness of Trying to Ass11age Lost Love With Money
While this argument may have had some appeal in the 1930s, the
10
development and expansion oftort law make this argument anachronistic.1
Damages for emotional distress arc recognized both as parasitic damages
Recovery is permitted for intentional
and as stand-alone damages.171
n
i fliction of emotional distress as well AS negligent infliction of emotional
distress.1 72 The concerns with the special problems presented by emotional
injuries, principally spurious claims, ultimately have not been found by

courts an adequate reason to refuse to recognize the injuries and a right of
recovery. m
The argument that it denigrates the lofty emotions of love and affection
to award monetary remedies for loss of those emotions s
i again an argument

166. Jones, supra note 40, at 63 (quoting attorney who appeared on Rivera live (CNBC
television broadcast, Aug. 11, 1997)).
167. Sugenerally RlCllARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). Judge Posner describes
public policy since lhe beginning of lhe Christian era as etfons to restrict sexual activity to
malriagc, and he notes that most Americans subscribe to that ideal. Id. at 243. Su also
CKA.\IALLAS, supra note 152, al 218 ("Despite its intimate cbam:ter, sexual conduct is highly
"'gulated activity, and lhe laws governing sex have been an especially active site of struggle
ovuthe boundaly between acceptable and legally aanctionable conduct.").
168. Carrington, supra note 60, at 903.
169. Id.
170. Kelly, supra note 111, at 432.
171. Lcvi�supra note 48,at 140-46.
172. Id.
173. Cbamallas, supra note 48, at 496 (observing that even opponents of permitting
recovery for emotional injuries "'cognizc wcalcncss of old arguments rcgardin& ease of
p=ting fake claimJ and difficulty ofcausation); Levit, supra note 48, at 184-88 (diacussing
studies subslantiating the reality and severity of emotional injuries).
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whose time has pas$ed.174 The argument of feminists and other reformers
was that love and marriage are not like market relations in which
commodities are bought and sold; instead, the selfless emotion of love
obviates the protections provided by legal regulations, which are needed in
the commercial marketplace.17s The label "heart balm" was used during the
first wave of legislative abrogation to satirize the notion that money
damages could make the heart feel better.176 Today, it is common practice
10 award money damages when a plaintiff bas suffered loss of love and
affection. Indeed, Professor Chamallas has observed that a failure to award
monetary damages for emotional harm disadvantages women and devalues
the injuries that they suffer.177

F. Attempt to Place Blame on A Third-Party When One or Both
Spouses Often Are Primarily to Blame I Marriage Was Worth
Very Little IfIt Could Be Broken Up
i a statement from an early
These related arguments are encapsulated n

critic: "(T]he action for alienation of affections, and to a considerable extent
the action for criminal conversation proceed on the hypothesis of a perfectly

by a
malicious, scheming and seductive intruder."178 I see nothing about the tort
theories that is based on such a presumption. Quite to the contrary, I think
these torts are based on the presumption that marriages arc delicate
relationships, which often teeter in the balance. It s
i often said that
marriage is bard work. That belief recognizes that spouses have to deal
with many matters that are not always fun, including balancing budgets,
making decisions about children, caring for aging parents and in-laws, and
so forth. A third person, who offers the fun and excitement of sexual
relations unencumbered by these other weighty matters, might be an

harmonious husband-wife relationship destroyed or impaired

attractive diversion, or more. Or, as one commentator said, "even a
relatively 'good' marriage may be susceptible to . . a Don Juan."179 The
torts ofcriminal conversation and alienation of affections declare providing
such sexua.I relations out ofbounds.
.

174. Cbamallas, 1upra note 48, al 497 ("[ijl is 100 late 10 complain about such a basic
fealU!e ofthe tons sySlem, unless one s
i prepared 10 do away with large areas oftort liability.'').
175. Tushnc� supra note 98, at 2590.
176. Note, supra notc 27, al 1771 n.4.
177. Cbamallas, supra note 48, al 497; see also Larson, mpra note 59, at 448.
178. Feinsingcr, supra note 11, at 995.
179. Kelly,supro note l ll,at431.
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i posed on a third person
Why, this argument queries, should a duly be m
not to interfere if the spouse, who wishes to engage, consents? 1111 I think the
answer should be that society values the relationship of marriage; society
recognizes that because marriage is not always a blissful relationship, it is
susceptible 10 outside interference; and finally, that because of these
considerations, society imposes a duty on everyone to avoid n
i terfering with
marriages, at least by means of engaging in sexual relations with a married
person. 111 T
his is the reason that I would recognize fault on the pan of the
12
In a society
third party who has sexual relations with a married persoo.1

that purpons 10 value relationships, panicularly marriages and family
relationships, and a tort law regime that has recognized expansive and
expanding duties to avoid injuring others, I think a duty should be
recognized not to interfere in an existing marriage. In my view, such
conduct is blameworthy.

This argument against the torts also is based on the idea that there arc
difficult causation and allocation of fault issues that the law should not
address. The causation argument usually suggests that the p
n
articipa
ti
§
spouse has a free will that is nOI overborne by the acts of the third party. 1
In ton terminology and theory, this is an argument about superseding
cause.11' Superseding cause has fallen into some disfavor among some
modem torts scholars under the rationale that it is inconsistent with a
1
i particularly
comparative fault regime. 15 Superseding cause analysis s

180. Stt, tg., �. rllfll'O note 7, 11 1248 (''These tO<IS could also opente unjustly by
punishing the d<fcndant for conduct to which bolh panicipanta conscnL").
181. Kelly, supra note 111, 11 431 (siating lha1 this azauma>t opinst the tons focuses on
pcnonality of plaintiff spouse and cJc.empbasazcs maliciousness of intcrloi>«'• "assault upon
the mamaae").
182. I lhlnk Professor Anita Bcmstein for her cballenaing argument Iha� although lhc
unfaithful spouse may have cngagcd in blameworthy conduct, lhe lhird party bas not. I disagree
wilh that "llWll<"� but 1 apimclate the f'ac1 that one who acccptS it will disagice with
recoanition ofa IOrt ofintentional intcifermce with marriage.
183. Sn Note, supra note 73, at 1518-20. lo lhc Englub action IO mtO\'Cf dama,es for
third-party cnllcement ofa servant, t
i was unnecessary to prove that the servant's will bad bttn
overcome by lhc lets of the third-party interferer. Id. 11 1520. 'The rationale was that the
SCIV&OI bad no fl<IC will Id. II 1526.
184. 'The problem was addressed in English law n
i 1881 n
i Bowen v. Hal� 6 Q.BD. 333
(1881). The COUii kVcred the intcrfctenee ,.;th contnct ton from tis mixed lu$toric:al rootS.
wlucb included lhc action of enticement (that nc
i lllclcd the rule of int<n-eruna Will). 'The COUii
limited cntic:emcnt actions IO lllOIW SCMUllS, and it announced lhat ocher intCJftJCOCCS wtn:
actionable if etfec1ed by a "malicious acltt Note, rupra no1e 73, at 1527; ,.. also Marie P.
Gergen, Torrious lnterfer�n«: How /1 Is Englllfing Commercial Law. W1iy This Is Nol Emirely
Bad. anda PnMlmtlalRupon#, 38 AlUZ. L REV. 1175, 1204 (1996) (discussin& Bowm).
185. S« Terry Christlieb, Note. W1iy Suptrttding C0Jae Analysis Sliovld Ik AbtzndtlMd,
72 TeX. L REY. 161 (1993); I« also Ooees, rupro Dote 7, at 461 (explaining that stat=cnts
about intervening and supmccling causes express conclusions. but they add a layer ofC011fu:sion
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objectionable when the harm that occurs was within the scope of
foreseeable risks created by the defendant's conduct. 116 In human
behavioral tenns, this is an argument about free will and autonomy. 187
Again, this is a situation in which it is too late n
i the day for tort law to
refuse to redress injuries because of such difficulties. Consider, for
example the various causation standards that have been developed in tort
law and beyond, including the lost chance of survival theory in wrongful
death cases.ia Furthennore, comparative fault has become prevalent in
modern tort law, often crossing the chimerical boundary between
negligence and intentional torts. That said, however, I do not see difficult
causation questions necessarily arising in all criminal conversation and
alienation of affections cases. The blamewortl1y conduct does cause
119
A spouse's expectation
damages, whether it breaks up a marriage or not.
of sexual fidelity within marriage has been destroyed, and regardless of
whether the marriage is destroyed, tbat is an emotional harm directly
traceable to the acts of the interloper. In cases in which the plaintiff claims
that the n
i terloper destroyed the marriage, the causation and degree of fault
issues are no more difficult than many other types of tort cases, and they
can be addressed through various causation standards (perhaps including
lost chance ofsurvival). a.nd if a court: so chooses, allocation of fault.
ln the end, this argument strikes me as specious. ln the difficult
causation and allocation of fault issues they may present, these torts are no
different from many others that modem tort law does recognize. The
solicitude regarding the tortfeasor being blamed for breaking up a marriage
i enigmatie.190 Of course adultery
that may already have been tr0ubled s
damages most marriages; n
i deed, some unknowable percentage of
.-ther than providing guidance regarding liability); RICHARD A El'sTEIN, ToRTS, § 10.12, 81
269 (1999) (recognizing that limitations of liability based on "causal intervention" have been
l
"widely criticized''); cf Kelsey L Joyce Hooke, Note, Colision
at�: Tlte /�I/ability of
the S�edirig Couse andPure Comparatltoe Pou/t Doctrines In Admiral/)'. 14 WASH. L Rev.
1S9 (1999) (arguing that maintenance of superseding cause analysis s
i inconsist<:nl with die
adoption ofa pure comparative fault regime n
i admiralty law).
186. Stt
. ...g., Do8BS,mpt"a note 7, § 192; RfsTATEMENT, lllF" DOie 8, § 281 ant. b.
187. Woodward, 11'pn> 001e 1S6, at 1120-22, 1122 n.68 (explaining lhat the caus.\tion issue
is also an issue about autonomy).
g
. • Joseph l King Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance n
I Personal Injury
188. Ste, e.
l
Tom lm'OMng l'rttXisitng ConditionsandFullill ConsrqutnCU, 90 YAJ..E. LJ. 1353 (1981).
189. Cf Woodwanl, supra note I56, at 1122-23 (discussing, both from n
i dividu.tlist and
relational perspectives, the damage that an interferer causes in an interference with contract
claim).
190. As the Nebraska Supreme Court observed, 'la) oaniage teetering on the brink of
domestic disaster should nevertheless be spa� a shove overthe precipice." Creason v. Myers,
3SO N.W.2d 526, 528 (Neb. 1984).
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marriages do not survive discovered adultery. Why arc we worried about
the n
i terloper being unfairly punished?

G. Improper Motivation ofRevenge as lmpelllsfor Bringing the Action
Some couns and commentators have stated that vindictiveness or a
desite to exact revenge are often strong motivations for suing for criminal
conversation or alienation ofaffections, and such motivations have no place
in ton Jaw.191 The Idaho Supreme Court said, "Revenge, which may be a
motive for bringing the cause of action, has no place in determining the
legal rights between two parties."192 I disagree. I think that one of the
principal reasons I sue someone for hitting me on the nose is that I want
revenge for his violation of a right of mine. That motivation is not a good
reason to abolish the ton of battery. Indeed, some theorize that the revenge
motivation is a basis on which all of ton law rests.193 So, I am willing to
concede that revenge is a powerful, and indeed usually the most powerful,
motivation for most criminal conversation and alienation of affections
actions. lf the right of action s
i denied, then the revenge may find some
other outlet. One possibility is a "blood feud."1" There are, of course,
other, more civilized, avenues for exacting revenge, such as going on 11
television show and discussing how one was wronged by an adulterous
spouse and partner, and perhaps even fighting on that show}" My guess is
that most readers who place themselves in the hypothetical at the beginning

t91. Dooos, supra � 7, at 1247 (slating tha1 some couru and legisla!U.re• !bat have

abolished the tons have been moved in part by the conclusiontha1 plaintiffs are motivated by
\indictivcoeS! and a desire IO inflid balm).
192. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho t994).
193. Benjamin C. Zlpursky, Rigltts, Wl'Oflg,t, a,,,/ Recoune In dre Law of Tons, SI VAND.
L REV. I, 100 (1998) (positin& a civil rtcoune theory ofion law under which ion law is lbout
what the state gives IO those whose rigJ\IS have been violated n
i place ofthe riah• 10 get cvco).

Cf. Wallet H. Beekham, Jr. Cl al.,

TOWARDS ... JURISPRUD!lNCE Of INJURY: 'lllE CONTINUINO

CREATION OF A SYS!D1 OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW, R.El'oRT TO THE
AMERCIAN BAR ASS'N 4-170 10 4-173 (1984) [hcttinafter TOWARDS A J�llOO'lcr). The

cownillCC discussed the ippropriateocss of punishment Incl rctnl>ution and concluded tbal
punisluncn1 plays a uscfW oullc:1 for the community scose ofustice.
j
Id. 11 4-172.
194. Zipursky. n.prv DOlC 193, at 83.
195. A mOIC crea1ivc Incl effective response may be lhal of lhc wife of a politician who
became the campaign chailpcrsoo of her cstn1ngcd husband's opponent and offered details of
her husband's unfallhfulncu in campaip messages. Rtp0rtwly Unfaithful Lawmaker's
Gr«Jtest F« is W'lfe, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge). Aug. ll, 2000, at llA. A more 1tavistic
response s
i illustrated by Wood v. °"'""' Enters., Inc., m which the husband conlionred the
paramour Incl beat him wilh 1 pipe. In the battciy clam, lhc court rejected the dcfcmes or
essmnptioo orthe ri$k Incl unclean hands. No. 2000414 , 200I Ala. Civ. App. L£}CIS 498, at •1.
(Ala. Civ App. Aug. 17, 2001).
.
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of this article wanted revenge on the Wlfaithful spouse's partner. That
seems to me a good reason for tort law to provide recourse rather than a
good reason to deny a right of action. Moreover, the loss of a sense of
retribution may lead to a loss ofa sense of wrong. 196
H.

interference Torts ' Dele"ence of a Variety of Types of
Conduct, /11c/uding Mere Persuasion

Professor Dobbs identifies one of the most disturbing characteristics of
au of the interference torts: they punish a broad range of conduct which can
be the means of accomplishing the interference, including mere persuasion
by speech. 197 This is what I consider the most effective criticism of
n
i terference torts generally, and alienation of affections and criminal
conversation specifically. It is not, however, a concern that is unique to
these tort theorics.198 !Defamation and n
i vasion of privacy arc two well
established tort theories that often limit speech and other expression. First
amendment concerns have added constitutional modifications to those tort
theories.
As Professor Dobbs points out, alienation of affections covers family
members who use speech to try to persuade another family member to leave
a spouse. It also could cover a friend who tries to persuade one spouse to
leave an abusive relationship. It could cover a potential paramour who
encourages one to leave a spouse so that they could have a sexual
relationship. It could cover use of "telephone sex," "chat rooms," and
"cybersex" to interfere in a marriage.'99 I think Professor Dobbs is right
that this tort potentially goes too far n
i punishn
i g too much conduct. As
with other interference torts, it becomes necessary to define what constitutes
an im
proper means to accomplish the interference. As I discuss further
below,200 I favor a narrower intentional interference with marriage tort that
196. Speaking of the role ofretributlcn n
i criminal law, an English lepl scholar expressed
this view well: "Without a sense of rctribu1ion we may lose our sense of wrong. Rl:tribution in
punishment s
i an expression of lhe cooununity'1 disapproval of crime, and if this retribution is
not given rceogllition the disapproval may also disappear." TOWARDS A JUIUSl'RUDENCE, S1lf"O
note 193, § 4-175 (quoting A. 000DHART, ENGLISH !AW ANDTIIEMORALIAW 92-93 (1953)).
197. Dobbs, supra note 24, at 361-63.
198. I thanlc Professor David Robc1lsoo for assuaging my concerns regarding this criticism
ofcriminal conversation and alienation ofaffections.
199. See Bartie Lancas1u, Latest Trend in Marital Problems: Internet Adultery, at
http://www.nandotimes.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2001); Jennifer Haiper, Sin Exists In
Cyberspace, Priest Dlllaru C>n·Unt Adu/toy Jlirtually as Immoral?, WASH. Tu!Es, June 8,
rtualStatt o
2000, at A3; Sandy Lawrence Ediy, A Jli
f
A
ff
airs: A Bttttr ll'ay to Chtat: OntKW
uads tothe Nextand SheFindsHerselfat the Hilton, NAT0L POST, Dec. 9, 2000, at BOt.
200. Seeinfra notes 359-65 and accompanying texL
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limits the improper means to engaging in sexual activity with a married
person. As we have been reminded in recent times, what constitutes
l
engaging in sex may vary from one person•s definition to another's.M
Most cases will not raise that issue, and those that do can be addressed,
perhaps by leaving what constitutes having sex to the jury.

IV. l.aOAL AND CULTURAL CoNDITIONS CONTRJBl!T'TNO TO THE DEMISE Of
CRIMINAL CoNVERSATION AND ALIENATION OF AFFECflONS

A. Evolving Tort Law: Some Torts Are More Equal Than Others
The twentieth century was a period of rapid expansion in American tort
law with recognition of new torts, new elements of damages, and new
duties. New torts have included invasion of privacy, intentional infliction
i violation of public
of emotional distress, and wrongful tennination n
i many contexts, includi
policy. 202 New damages have been recognized n
of
emotional distress, loss of enjoyment life, and lost chance of survival.

�

Duties recognized under the ·theory of negligence have expanded
i cluding duties to rescue and to protect against third-party
substantially, n
criminal activity. Indeed, the histo of tort law over the last century can be
an
.
Of course there have been periods of
sion
summarized in a wo�xp
time and areas of tort law in which contraction rather than expansion
occurred. In the midst of the general e an
sio
n
, the heart balm torts stand

�

�

t
ion.
Although candidates for new
out as a rare instance of contrac
206
torthood often do have to be pushed hard for recognition, and some fail, it
201. Consider, for eumple, President Clinton's speech in which he proclaimed that be "did
not have sexual relations with thal womanO, Miss Lewinsky." Jenoifer 0. Hickey, Nation: The
uwinsky Scandal, !NSIOHT MAOAZINI:, Jan. 4, 1999, al 14. Also, rccenl reports indicate that

1eenagon do DOI consider engaging in oral sex u "having sex." Karen S. Peterson, Tttnagers
Define "Having Sex" Differently, CH!cAOO SUN-1lMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at 31; see also Pamela
JohMon, Are You Cheating?, BsENCE, Jan. 1, 2001, at 103 (discussing whether emotional
attachments to noospouscs constinue marital infidelity).
202. See genero//y Bernstein, supra no1e 45 (discussing characteristics of successful new

tons).

203. See, e.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort R.efomi: Gender
Injustice In Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. I, 19-20 (I99S) (discussing twentieth cenrury
expansion ofton law to recognize emotional, dignitary, and relational banns).
204. Dowling, supra note 46, at 488 (discussing general expansion ofton law in twentieth
cenrury).
20S. Id. at 489 (calling heart balm legislation "probably the best modem example of
restricting ton liability'').
206. Bernstein, supra note 4S, at I S44.
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is a bizarre occurrence for established torts with pedigrees to be abrogated.
What aspects of tort law help explain this demise?

I. The Less Than Spectacular ruse of the Ethereal Torts
Since the early twentieth century, there has been a movement in
American tort law to loosen it from its moorings in recognizing recovery for

only injury to physical person and property. One strand of this development
has been recognition of emotional or mental injuries. Although mental
distress could be recovered as an element of parasitic damages before this
movement, 207 the courts were reluctant to permit recovery when the only
n
i jury suffered was emotional.206 The other strand was recognition of
injuries to relationships. Until Professor Leon Green began championing
the cause of relational injuries in the 1930s,209 American tort law paid little
attention to such n
i juries as a distinct type of tort recovery. Professor Levit
0
combined these two strands of development in the term "ethereal torts."21
The evolution of tort law in this century has seen the growing
recognition of tort recovery for bolh emotional injuries and relational
injuries. In the area of emotional injuries, for example, all or aImost all
jurisdictions now reco izc intentional infliction of emotional distress or
the tort of outrage,21 which debuted in a 1948 Supplement to the

p

Restatement (First) of Torts.212 Relational torts have not made a similar

widely chronicled march toward acceptance for a couple of reasons. The
first reason is that the category of relational torts does not have boundaries
that are as distinct as those of the emotional distress torts: some torts are

full-fledged members of the relational torts club while others have partial
memberships. Second, most of the relational torts are not new; ralher, they
have existed for centuries, but it is only in the last century that tihey have
come to be considered as redressing n
i juries to relationships.
The category of relational torts is amorphous, consisting of a few pure
relational tort theories and many occasional relational tort theories.

Defamation,213 malicious prosecution, and invasion of privacy, for example,
207.
208.
209.
(1940).
2.10.
211.

DOees, supra note 7, al 822; Levi!, supra noie 48, at 142.
DOBBS, supra noie 7, al 822; Levit, supra no1e 48, at 142.
See. e.g., Green, supra nole 49; lroN GREEN, CASES ON INJURIES

TO

RELATIONS

Levit,supra nole 48.
DOBBS, supra nole 7, al 826; Carl Tobias, Intentional Infliction ofMental Dlltress in
Montana, 51 MONT. L. REv. 99 (1996).
212. DOBBS, supra nole 7, at 825; Levi!supra note 48,al 142-43.

213. Defamation comes close to being a pun: �tational ion. Professor GICCll obsctved !hat

"file defamatory bann s
i by its very natun: most apposile 10 �lational intettslS." Green, supra
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are not "pure" relational torts, but instead occasional relational torts; that is
to
say, these tort theories do not redress only n
i juries to relationships,
although they may be employed in that context in an appropriate case.
Perhaps the only pure relational tort ofrecent vintage is wrongful discharge
2•
in violation of public policy. 1 Moreover, two of the emotional injury torts,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of
emotional distress are occasionally relational torts, often invoked in the
context of relational injuries, but not applying exclusively n
i that context.
second
reaso
n
for
the
quiet
march
of
relat
ional
torts
is that most of
The
them have existed for a long time, but they were not, until the twentieth
century, thought of as redressing relational injuries. Loss of consonium, a
derivative tort claim, was recognized at common law in England. It was
considered, however, as redressing an injury to property-in ury to the

{

1
bundle of consortium interests that a husband had in his wife. 5 Loosed
26
from its property basis, 1 loss of consortium has survived and even
expanded, recognized in all jurisdictions for spomes, and recognized in
some jurisdictions for loss of consortium of other family members, such as
27
parents, children, siblings, and grandparents. 1 Alienation of affections and
criminal conversation, like loss of consortium, were recognized as relational
tons once the old property basis for the torts was undennined by the
2
Married Women's Property Acts. 18 There is still some debate regarding
whether interference with business n
i terests is a property or relational

tort. 219

note 49. at 474. Tho injury on which the ton focl!KI is damage io reputation. Becaust
reputation exisis .among communities and groups of people, defamation indirectly addressse
relauonal injury.
214. Ahhoug)l interference with business or contractual relations is a puR relational ton, it
is nOI new. The seminal case recognizing the ton is Lumley v. Gye, 2 E&B 216, 22 LJ.Q.B.
463 {1853). But it arguably traces back 10 founeenlh century England. Dobbs, supra note 24, at
336. But su Gergen. supra note 184, at 1200 {discussing three theories regarding roots of the

ton). According Co Professor Gergen, !he pre-history ofthe !Ort clepcnds on which of the three
roois one selects. Id. at 1200-01 n.138. See also Nole, supra note 73, al 1510 (discumng the
pre-Lumley an1eciodents of the ton).

215. See supra notes 1 1·I3 and accompanying text.
216. Lipprnan,supm note 65. at 653·54; Clwnallas, supra DOie 48, at 528.
217. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3!0; Clwnallas, supra notc48, at S-02 & n.151, 514.
218. O'Neil v. Schuekardt, 733 P.2d 693, 696 {Idaho 1986) (''The aclion for alienation of
affections evolved from an action protecting propeny iniercsts to one protecting relational
interests."). For criticism of the extension ofthe tons IO women once the propeny besis was
eradicated, see LipptJWl, supra note 65, at 659.

219. Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Hoimts on Efficient Breach and
Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1100 (2000) {oontrasting lhe property
characterization of Epstein wilh the n:lational characterization ofother commentators).
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The expansion of the emotional and relational injury torts has not,
despite much writing about them in scholarly journals, been an unqualified
220
As recent commentators have noted, the torts redressing
success story.
emotional and relational injuries are second-class citizens in the torts
hierarchy.221 Courts remain skeptical about many issues, including proof of
the harm and the causal connection between the defendant's act and the
harm. Consid
e
r for example, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distreSS for n
i jury to a third party-bystander recovery. In the prototypical
case, a parent sues a defendant who, in the parent's presence, negligently
physically injures the parent's child-defendant negligently drives a vehicle
and strikes the child as the parent watches.m Most jurisdictions have
recognized a right to recovery for bystander emotional distress,223 but they
J.g lcd with the restrictions that should be placed on such
tru
have s
recovery. 4 The uneasiness of courts and some legislatures w
ith bystander
recovery should not be surprising. 11 has weaknesses from both strands of
ethereal torts: it provides recovery for an injury that is both purely
emotional and it is, in a sense, a relational injury, in that some relationship
(usually family) is required for recovery. The injury is not actually an
injury to the rclationsbip, but the emotional distress that results is a product
of the relationship. Thus, proof of the relationship serves to corroborate
that extreme emotiona1 distress likely would result from observing injury to
the person.
The demise of criminal conversation and alienation of affections began
in the 1930s as the ethereal torts were beginning their arduous ascent.
Criminal convcrsatioo and alienation of affections have been, since the
220. Levi� supra nocc 48, at 163-74 (discussing "significant institutional barriers" that have
limited development or cthcll'C81 torts).
221. Chamalll!!l, s11pra note 48, at 500 ("Like emotional harms, relational injuries continue
10 rank at the bottom of the legal hierarchy orinjuric.1. "); Levit, s11pra note 48, at 163·74.
222. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1968).
223. Coruol. Rall Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 534 n.3 (1994).
224. California wu the fim state to re<:ognize such a ton rocovcry with dis1inct elements
tbalsbould beconsidcrcd in Diiion. 441 P.2d 11 912-28. Because of concerns that the tort was

1o0 ill-defined and pcrbaps lhat liability was being expanded too much, the California Supreme
Coul1 tightened the ton and transformed the Diiion considerations into clements that must be
"'°""" in 171/ng v. La Cluua, nt P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989).
The Louisiana Supcemc: Court first recognized bystander recovery in Ltjeune v. Rayne
Bronch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990). The coun articulated four elements that had to be
satlllicd for rocovcry. Id. at 570. The legislature responded by enacting Civil Code anicle
2315.6, in which it adopted the elements from Lejeune, but restticted the family relationship to

specified rclationshipS-<lpousc, child, paren� sibling, grandparent, or grandchild. LA. OVJL
CODE M'N. an. 2315.6, n.I S (West 1997). The Louisiana Supreme Court arguably restricted
recovery beyond the language ofthe article in Trahan v. McManus, 128 So. 2d 1273, 1278-80
(La. 1999).
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demise of the property underpinning, pure relational torts, and the recovery
is solely for emotional injuries. On the relational torts side, criminal
conversation and alienation of affections are like loss of consortium in their
recognition of remedy for injuries to family relationships. They are,
however, more susceptible to criticism than loss of consortium on two
i loss of consortium claims, the relative has been the victim
grounds. First, n
of some freestanding tort, usually of the well-established variety, and the
relative has suffered some injury, usually physical. Thus, the derivative
nature of the loss of consortium claim distinguishes it from criminal
conversation and alienation of affections. This point will be discussed more
fully below. Second, in loss of consortium claims the relative has been the
unwilling victim of a distinct tort; in contrast, in criminal conversation and
alienation of affections, the spouse may be a willing participant in conduct
tha.t de>es not constitute a separate tort.
2.

Special Problems of Relational Torts

a. The Favored Derivative Relational Torts
Setting aside the occasional relational torts, there arc tort theories that
redress only injuries to relationships. Included among these arc torts and
elements of damages that address family relationships (wrongful death, loss
ofconsortium, criminal conversation, and alienation of affections), business
relationships (interference with business or contracrual relations), and
employment relationships (wrongful discharge).m Among these, wrongful
death and loss of consortium are different from the others in that they are
derivative, anchored to some n
i dependent tort to the relative of the
consortium plaintiff, and usually226 a tort that caused death or physical
injury. In this way, wrongful death and loss of consortium, arc similar to
bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. Tethered to "hard"
injuries to person, these torts do not cause the courts as much concern about
permitting recovery. 227 Accordingly, it is wrongful death and loss of
consortium that are the most widely accepted and least controversial among
225. "There are other relationships, such :as political and community or social. See Green,
supra DOie 49.
226. I qualify this because there are loss of consonium cases in which 1he relative of the
plaintiffsuffered reputational or emotional injury rather than physical injury. Su, e.g., Minion
v. Gaylord"s lnt"I Corp., 541 So. 2d 209, 209 (La. CL App. 1989) (children of victim of
malicious prosecution brought loss of oonsortium claims).
227. Cbamallas, supra note 48, at 502 ("Tort law . . generally tteats relational injwics
merely as supplemental lo 'primary' claims for physical hann . . . .j.
.
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the pure relational torts.228 Wimess the troubled careers of the other pure
but freestanding relational tons. First, the successful assault on criminal
conversation and alienation of affectioru; is discussed above.
Second,
although many jurisdictions recognize some fonn of intentional interference
with business or contractual relations,229 it is also one of the most
controversial torts, provoking considerable scholarly criticism. 2lO Finally,
some jurisdictions recognize the tort of wrongful termination, while others
do not, and tl1e scope of the tort in those jurisdictions that recognize it
varies.n• Thus, being freestanding relational torts puts alienation of
affections and criminal conversation in the camp of the weaker relational

torts.
It is a significant cha.racteristic of the relational torts that the freestanding
relational torts are so suspect and controversial. ln a world of "new
property," where relationships arc more important than ownership of
tangible property,232 it is remarkable that tort Jaw does not provide more
protection against conduct that directly interferes with relationships.m It is
indicative of the fact, however, that tort law has recognized emotional and
relational banns, but it has not provided protection against such hanns at the
same level as it bas to banns to physical property and person. Some
i balance, have described this as a residual
commentators. noting this m
i pact on women, who suffer
historical bias and one that has a disparate m
more emotional and relational injuries and suffer more from such injuries

228. Id. ar SOI (labeling wrongful dealh and loss ofconsortium as !he rnosr impo11ar11 bMcs
for compcnsa1ion for ncgligen1 intciferenc:e wilh relationships).
229. Sttgmtral/y OOBBS,mpra no4e 1, ch. 32; Gergen, J'lll"'O note 184, at 1180.81.
230. Stt. 11.g., Dobbs, supra DOie 24; Dowtina. n;pra note 46; Harvey S. Perlman,
lnttrfenmce with Contract and Other Economic E:xpecta•cieJ: A Clash of Tort and Contract
Docrrln•, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1982).
231. Stt gmtral/y MARK A. R<m!STEIN ET AL., E>.!Pl.OVMENT I.AW ch. 8 (2d ed. 1999). I
limit lhc discussion betc to the ton of wroogful discharge n
i violation of pubic
l policy. I
recognize, however, that some jurisdictions treat breach of the covenan1 of good faith and fair
dealing as a tort lhcory.
232. Stt mpra nolCs 48-S0, 146-149 andaccompanying teXL
233. Stt Levit, supra note 48, at ISO ("The development of procection for relational
interests evidences a communitarian view of the role ofton law
The vision being promoted
isone of responsible .s.ocia1 internet.inn: a commitment lo 1he value of the permanency of
rela1ionships and to appropriate treatment within those relationships.").
.

•

.

•
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than do men. "4 Tort law evolves to recognize new conditions in changed
society, but old biases and priorities do not give way quickly or easily.:m

b. The Disfavored Freestanding Relational Torts
Even within the weaker subset of pure and freestanding relational torts,
there are characteristics that suggest additional sources of concern with
criminal conversation and alienation of affections. All of the freestanding
236
relational torts are interference torts -that is, someone interferes with the
relationship, and that interloper is the tortfeasor and defendant
i.

The Marriage Interference Torts Compared With the 811siness
Interference Torts

The business interference torts are among the most controversial theories

in tort law, and yet they are more widely accepted than criminal
237
conversation and alienation of affections.
All states in the United States

�

c
o
e some version of interference with business or contractual
now re
They provide a logical point of comparison with criminal
e
rlations.
conversation and alienation of affections because of similarities: they have

234. Cbamallas, supro note 48; suolso K0<0nig & Rustad, supra note 203, at 19-20, 24-29
(discussing the evolution in ton law to recognize emotional and relational injuries to women,
but also noting that gendered nanue of ton remedies s
i obscured, and ton reform movement will
restric1 rights won by feminists).
23:5. Cbamallas, supro note 48. Professor Bernstein bas described the paradoxes that are
most helpful t() !()It wlJlll�.� �!JISlci!!, wp.ro oo!� 45, Ill 1S44-52. Lilck of novelty and less

''onness" (being tied to contract or property law) are two of the paradoxes that facilitate
recognition. Id.
236. Doess, supra note 7, at ch. 31-32. Chapter 31 of Professor Dobbs' treatise is entitled
"Interference with Family Relationships," and it includes discussion of criminal conversation
and alienation ofaffections. Cliapter 32 is entitled "Interference with Contract and Economic
Opponunity Generally," and it includes discussion of intentional and negligent interference with
busine:ss and contractual relations and wrongful discharge from employment See also
MARsHAU.S. SHAPO, TORT AND INJURY LAW, 965-91 (2d ed. 2000).
237. See ERIC RASMUSEN, AN ECoNOMIC APPROACH TO ADULTERY 17 (Center for Law,
Economics, and Business, Harvard John M. On
il Discuss
ion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No.
322, 2001) (noting that while alienation ofaffections has gone out of style, "[o)ddly enough, the
similar action of tonious interference with contract is alive and well."), available at
http://www.law.barvard.cdulprograms/olin_ce:nter.bbnl.
238. Gaiy D. Wexler, Intentional Interference with Contract: Market Efficiency and
Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CoNN. L. REV. 279, 292 (1994). Louisiana was the last
state to recognize the ton in 1989 in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v
. Spumey, 538 So. 2d228 (La. 1989).
Looisiana reoogniud a Vtf'J lifilited venion of !lie tort and has adhered to that version.
Healthcare Mgmt Servs., Inc. v. Vantage Healthplan, Inc., 748 So. 2d 580 (La. Ct. App. 1999)
(recognizing limitation ofSpumey).
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common historical roots;239 they are freestanding relational torts; and they
are third-party interference torts. Moreover, the debate over the appropriate
theory and scope of the business interference torts was being waged around
the time of the first wave of legislative abrogation of the heart balm torts.1AO
While I do think the comparison is informative in considering the role of
relational tort law, 1 do not mean to suggest that every aspect of law and
regulation that is appropriate for business and commerce is appropriate for
marriage and family. 241
Critics of the business interference torts argue that they undermine the
doctrine of efficient breach.242 The efficient breach doctrine is traced to
Oliver Wendell Holmes' statement: "the duty to keep a contract at common
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it
and nothing else."243 Proponents of efficient breach theory thus argue that
there is nothing wrongful about a breach, and that by permitting efficient
breaches, the law facilitates movement of resources to their most valuable
use. 244 The critics thus point out that the business interference torts

discourage efficient breaches by discouraging third parties from offering
better deals as alternatives to existing business relationships. "If a person is
free to breach a contract and pay damages, why should it be tortious for a
third party to induce the contract party to do what she is free to do?"24s
In some cases, the business interference torts would impose liability on a
third-party interferer when contract law would not impose breach of
contract liability on the party terminating the relationship. This situation is
analogous to criminal conversation and alienation of affections because one
of the partners to a marriage can terminate it on the basis of irreconcilable
differences. Consider, for example, an employee who has an employment239. Dobbs, supra note 24, at 341; Gergen, supra note 184, at 1200-01. Professor Gergen

describes three theories regarding the historical roots ofthe tort.

240. Gergen,supranote l84,at 1211-18.
241. Cf., Difo111.0, supra note 53, at 958-59 ("To insist on the business na!llie of marriage
vows not only demeans their importance, but emphasizes enforcement at the oost of the very
trust most beneficial to the fulfillment of those vows."). Indeed, 1 think some feminists who
decry the commodification of sex will object to the comparisons and the use ofcommercial and
business language to draw some parallels. For discussion of feminist opposition to the
commodification ofsexual relations, see CHAMALLAS, supra note 152, at 230.36.
242. See. e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 185, § 21.3 (1999); Perlman, supra note 230, at 78-91;
Dowling, supra note46, at 506-10.
243. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). It has
been argued, however, that the efficient breach theory results from a misreading of Holmes.
Perillo, supra note 219.
244. Woodward, supra note 156, at 1139.
245. Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the Doctrine of
Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the Notion ofthe Contract Breacher as Wrongdoer, 41 BUFF. L
REv. 645, 674 (1999).
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at-will contract with her employer, and she is induced by another employer
to leave that employment and accept employment with him. According 10
246
Why,
the Restatement (Secood), the interference would be actionable.
critics ask, should a third party be liable for inducing the employee to do
what she had a right to without incurring any liability for breach of
conttact?247
The comparison to interference with marriage is particularly apt.2411
Given that divorce is available now without proof of fault,249 marriage is in
ways li.ke an at-will employment relationship: it can be terminated for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. If a spouse is free to end a marriage
at will, why then should a third party be liable for contributing to the end of
the marriage?250 Although a comparison between interference torts in the
context of terminable at-will business relations and in the context of
marriages that can be terminated without proof of fault is instructive, I will
preface that comparison by recognizing that marriages are not exactly like
terminable at-will business relationships. The state and the law do become
involved n
i the dissolution of marriages, but not in the termination of at-will
contracts. The state involvement suggests that the state recognizes the
i a way that it does not with privately
implication of third-party interests n
n
.
Thus,
even
if efficient breach doctrine might call
handled a1-will co tracts
for limitations on the business interference torts, such limitations might not
necessarily be appropriate for interference with marriage torts.
One response applicable to both the business interference torts and the
i that the focus on whether the party to the
marriage interference torts s
246, RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 766 cmL g; ste also E.D. Locey Mills, Inc. v, Keith,
359 S.E.2d 148, I55-S6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "maliciou.s and wrongful nlcrferencc
i
with
such employment by anothtt is actionable althou&b the employment be IIwill").
247. See. e.g., Perlman. supra note 230, at 90-91 ("lr the efficiency principles or contract
i ducing breach of
law suggest that a third party using lawful means should DOI be liable for n
enfo<ceable promises, then a fortiori, the same rule should apply to wrenforcable
eJ<pectancics."); EPSTEIN, supra note l 8S, at 584,
248. I thank ProrCSSO< Bemslein ror challenging me on this poirlL Sbe argues that the
bu.siness interference ION, for whatever problems they have, continue to require intent to harm
the relationship, and in this criminal conversation and alienation of affections differ from the
business interference tons becllUse intent to hann the relationship usually is not the purpose or
the third party. While I agree that most third parties do not have lite subjective purpose or
dama�ng a marriage, I tbinlc if knowledge or the existence or the marriage s
i eslablished (as I
would require under my proposed modlfied ton orintentional nterference
i
with marriage), then
the objective definition ortortious intent, knowledge to a substantial ccnainty, s
i satisfied. See.
e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
249. Sttgt:neral/y Difonzo,supra note SJ.
2SO. DOBBS, supa note 7, at 1247; lra M. Ellman & Stephen D. Sugannan, Spousal
Enwrianal Abuse as a Tort?, SS MD. L. REV. 1268, 1297 (1996); McDougal, supra note 32, at
182-83.
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contract could be liable for breach at the time of tennination docs not
consider the full range of potential liability. An at-will employee, for
example, may be free to leave his employer, but there s
i conduct that she

can engage in while employed that may give rise to a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, trade secrets violation, or unfair trade practiccs.251
Similarly, a spouse may be free to terminate a marriage, but adultery is
conduct that oocurs while married, and many states still treat it as illegal,
even if they do not impose civi
l liability.m
A second response is given by a defender of the business interference
torts. Professor Woodward argues that the contractarian view-if no breach
of contract damages could be awarded against the party, then no tort
liability should be lmposed on the third-party interferer-ignores the bigger
picture of relationships and the benefits that they bestow on those who are
2" According to Professor Woodward's
not parties to the relationship.
argument, because contract law docs not cover all the interests implicated in
relationships, there s
i room for tort law, and contract law should not provide
the boundaries for recovery.2.!4
Professor Woodward's defense applies with at least equal force to
criminal conversation and alienation of affections. Third parties, most
2"
significantly childrcn in some cases, and society at large have interests in

the stability of marriages. Just as contract law does not occupy the whole

251. ROTllSTEJN, supm no«e 231, §§ 7.11,7.12.
252. The plaintiff in an Idaho case sought, unsucc:esl
s lilly, to expand the action for criminal

conversation to her husbend. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 815 (Idaho 1994).
253. Woodward, supn1llO(e 156, at 1170-76.
254. Id. at 1179. <Anrro Perlman, supm note 230, at 90 ("Rules regulatina third-pany
nt
i erference should advance whatever policy contract law pursues in withholding enforcement
of an agreement.").
255. Recently, the conuoversy of whether children suffer lifelong banns from divorces was
f Divorce.
rekindled by Dr. Judith Wnllerstein's controversial book, The Unexpected Legacy o
WALLERSTEIN ET AL, supra nOlc 29. See Kim, n1pra note 30 (discussing the conuoversy over
the effects 1>fdivorce on children). Polls indicate that Americans do believe that divorces hann
children. In a poll conducted for Time/CNN in September 2000, 64% of those responding to
the survey said that childmi are "almost always" or "frequently" harmed by divon:e. Id. The
concern ova the effeclS of divorce on children also is indicated by a bill recently introduced in
Colomdo, the Childml of Divorce Protection Act, that would have required married couples
with depend'.ent childml, after filing for divorce, to underao a year of coU11Seling, focusing on
"CUJTCnt and future potential hann to children" before the divorce would become final. H.R. 011342, 63rd Gen. Assem, Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo. 200 I); see Trent Seibert, Wcmren: Divorce Biii
Scary, DENVER POST, Feb. 27, 2001 at A·l3. The bill provided some exceptions IO the
coU1lSeling t'Cquitcment, including cases of physically or pSychologically abusive spouses. Id.
The bill failed in a legislative committee. Kyle Henley, lrrtconcilable Difftrencts Kiii Divorce
Bil� ClAZE:TTE (Boulder), March 9, 2001, at Al. After the bill's defea� the sponsor of the bill,
Slate representative Dave Schultheis, said, "This bill, I consider, s
i a shot across the bow of the
culntre ofdivorce. It s
i a baule against the S1aluS quo, and it is a battle for our children." Id.
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field of business and protect all of the interests implicated by contracts,
family law, which addresses the termination of marriages, may not occupy
the whole field of marriages and protect all of the interests implicated.
Third, differences between criminal conversation and alienation of
affections on the one hand and the business torts on the other make the at
will argument less forceful in the marriage context. The harm redressed by

criminal conversation,

at least, is not necessarily the teanination of the
relationship. Stated differently, a plaintiff is suing for economic damage
resulting from the destruction of the business relationship in the business
interference torts. In contrast, a plaintiff in a criminal conversation action is
suing for the emotional distress caused by the adultery, regardless of
whether the marriage is terminated.
Another argument against the business interference torts, based on the
efficient breach doctrine, is that the business interference tons deter
efficient breaches, and this thwans movement of resources to their most
valuable use. This is often framed as a criticism of the business interference
tons for thwarting competition.ZS6 Indeed, the privilege or justification of
competition is an issue that often arises in the business interference cases.m
I have never read an argument that criminal conversation and alienation of
i the market
affection should be nbolished because they stifle competition n
for sexual relations. Nonetheless, society's attitudes toward adultery and
indicate that this may be one of the reasons for
the incidence of adul

tery"'

opposition to the torts. Indeed, the argument regarding personal autonomy
is a version of this argument: a married person is still an autonomous hwnan
being and may choose to have extramarital sexual relations. ls this not a
competition, open markets, and efficient breach argument?

Professor Epstein forcefully aniculates one aspect of the competition
argument when he says, "[i]t clogs competition even to hint that T might
quit his job with P before he is allowed to eotenain offers from D."2.19 Does
the same competition and efficient breach argument apply to marriages?
That is, should a spouse be able to sample the market for better offers
before deciding whether to terminate the marriage? Although the question
may sound icily economic as applied to marriages, one could argue that
making that option available may save marriages because one may go out
on the sexual relations market, entertain competitive offers, and decide to

2S6. See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 1S6, at 1 171; &sl'EIN, supra note 18S, at 576.
2S7. Woodward, supra note IS6, at 11 18-19; El'STEIN, supra note 185, at S76.
2S8. Seeinfra notes 335-38 and accompanying text.

259. EPSTEIN, supra note ISS, atS84.
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remain in the marriage.260 Under a more restrictive regime, one may so
strongly wish to test one's market power that one is willing to end the

marriage, if necessary, to do so. This is not an easy issue. Even if we
choose to adopt a regime that attempts to control competition in the
extramarital sexual relations market, we must admit that such a regime will
not be completely successful261 Moreover, that failure to deter some
extramarital sexual competition may save some maniages.
One final point of comparison between the business interference tons
and the marriage interference torts is in order. One commentator, in
comparing the torts, wrote as follows: "In one sense, liability for
n
i terference with contract is less justified than even the alienation of
affections action. lo the business realm the injured party may still sue under
the contract, but under the bean balm statutes the rejected lover bas no
remedy at all."262 At first blush, this sounds like a weak justification for the
marriage interference torts vis-a-vis the business n
i terference torts. Does it
amount to nothing more than, when a person gets hurt, there must be
someone to sue? In part, that is the argument. But, the purpose of tort law
is, in pan, to provide civil redress so that "[t]be law reigns, not fits of
ly s
i an area where emotions
private vengeance."26l Interference with fami
aic panicularly bot, and the potential for blood feuds is the highest. If tort
Jaw will not provide a remedy against the spouse, leaving that area of
regulation to divorce law, and the interference is considered wrongful, then
tort law's providing a remedy against the third-party interferer might serve a
well-recognized objective of the civil Jaw-providing recourse for a
wrongfully inflicted injury. Maybe that is one reason why, even after the
abolition of criminal conversation and alienation of affe<:tions in most
jurisdictions, plaintiffs continue trying to find ton theories that can be made
to apply to adultery.264
ii. The Marriage Interference Torts Compared with the
Employment Torts
260. Notwilh.nanding the pain lhat is caused by disclosed or discovered extramarital affairs,
marriages survive. Stt. t.g., SPRING, supra note S; Kay Miller, After an Affair, STAR

some

lltlBVNE{Minneapolis-St. Paul), Jan. 23, 2000, al IE.
261. >.£ already discussed,, courts, legislllOrS, llld comm<ntatOrs who have favored
abolition of criminal conversation and alienation of affections have argued that extramarital
sexual activity is not �rrcd by law. I am DOI willing IO concede that i
i bas DO delern:nt effect
wliauoever, but I do coocede that, like most tort law, ii will not deter all misconduct.
262. Dowlin& supra noce 46, at 489.
263. Zipur.;Jcy, supra note 193,11 84.
264. For a diJcusson
i of alternative theories pW'lued by plaintiffs, - supra aoces 11S-27
llld acc:ompanyg
in text.
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i most analogous to the marriage interference
The employment tort that s
torts is third-party interference with an employment relationship. That tort
already has been covered above as an interference with business ton. There
is 8J1 additional employment relational tort that merits comparison with the
rria e interference to1ts. Wrongful termination in violation of public
a
m

�
policy""' is different

from

the other

freestanding

relational torts in that it

involves only two paities. It is the one type of interference tort in which the
266 It
i perpetrated by a party to the contract or relationship.
interference s
also is one of the newest tort theories, tracing its origins to Professor
Lawrence Blades' article, Employment at Wiii vs. Individual Freedom: On

Limiting the Abusive Exercise ofEmployer Power.u.1

There are three interesting parallels between wrongful termination and
the marriage interference torts that are worth noting. First, this is a context
in which, under contract law, the paities to the relationship usually are free
to terminate the relationship without liability. Employment at will is the
starting point for virtually all American labor and employment law.2611

Under this doctrine, employers have almost unfenered freedom to tenninate
employees. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, either party to
an employment relationship may terminate the relationship for a good
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.269 When Professor Blades
proposed the tort of abusive discharge, he recognized that his proposal
represented a significant impingement of tort law in an area theretofore

26S. MoSI of lhc theories of �very for employment termina1ion arc breach of c<>nlrael
theories, such as breach of cxprcu conimct terms, promissory cstoppcl, and breach of the
i a
covenant of good failh. In contmsl, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy s
relational ton �1eory. See DOBllS, s11pra note 7, at § 454; RoTHSTEIN, supra note 231, ch. 8.
i a party
266. Professor Dobbs state& lhat breach of a contract to wh.ich lhe breacher s
technically is DOI an interference. Doees, supra note 7, at 1287. Nonetheless, Dobbs recognizes
lhat, since one can view such tons u interference wilh one's own conll'1Ct, they belong in tbc
same chapterof tbc treatise wilh thc business intcrfemi<:e ions. Id.
267. Lawrmce Blades, Emplo)'mtnt at Wifl V$. Individual Frttdom: On Umfting the
Aburfrll Exercls• o/Empto,.erPower, 67 COWM. L. R.Ev. 1404 (1967). The tol1 actually can be
traced to as early as 1959. See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless nger: A Critique of
the Model Employment Tennfnatfo11 Act, 43 A'il. U. L. Rev. 849, 865 (1994) (citing California
case). It did not rake hold, however, until tbc publication of Professor Blades' groundbreaking
aniclc. Professor Blades actually 11fBUed for a broader abusive discharge tort lhan lhe current
vCJSions of wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy, but his anicle fueled the debate
over ton law's impingement on employment at will. Blades, supra.
i the exception, having enacted lhe Montana Wrongful Disclvge from
268. Moniana s
Employment Act of 1987, which imposes a good cause termination requirement on most jobs
beyond a probationary period. MO)>IT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 10 39-2-914 (200t).
269. Blades, supra note 267, at 1405 (quoting Payne v. Western & All. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507,
519-20 (1884), overruled 011 other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)).
i generally said to be American legal writer Horace Gay Wood in A
The source of the "rule" s
TkEATISE ONTHE v.w Of MASTERAND SERVA>(]"(1877). RontSTE!N, supra note 231, al 671.
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Nonetheless, given the importance of
governed by contract law.
employees' interest in the employment relationship, be argued that it was
appropriate to circumvent the "unyield%§" contract principles in favor of
"the more elastic principles of tort Jaw.'
Thus, where the interest of the
individual and society is significant and contract Jaw provides no remedy, it
is appropriate to fashion a relationail tort.
i a principle of
Marriage is governed largely by family law. There s
i analogous to employment at will
family law regarding marriages that s
no-fault divorccs.271 Under the no-fault divorce regime, parties to a
marriage essentially can teaninate the relationship for "irreconcilable
differences"m-good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. The absence
of a family law or contract remedy, however, should not be a reason to
refuse to recognize a relational tort if that is appropriate in consideration of
the interests of the injured individual, third parties, and society. 273 I think
i terests are sufficiently important to justify the
the societal and individual n
incursion of tort law into family law. Note, however, that the remedy for a
marriage interference tort is not against the other party to the relationship,
as in wrongful discharge, but instead it is against a third-party interferer.
Should a tort recovery be recognized against the unfaithful spouse?274 That
i beyond the csope of this article, and it involves creating greater
issue s
tension between tort law and famiiy law, which generally permits no-fault

270. Bladcs,.ntpro no!C269,at 1422.
271. I am not fighting lhe battle of fault-based versus no-fault divorces or regular marriages
ve11US covenant marriages. See generally Diflonzo, si1pra ooto SJ. Louisiana and Arizona have
legislatively adopted covenant marriage, which makes divorce less accesb
si le. LA. R.Ev. STAT.
AAN. §§ 9:272 to 9:27S.I (West 1998); M.12.. REV. STAT. /\liW. §§ 2S·901 to 2S·906 (West
2000). Regarding the Louisiana act, � Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant
Marriage: Social Analysis and legal lmplfcations, S9 LA. L. REV. 63 (1998). Covenant
marriage bills have been pr�d in several other alltes. Lynn Marie Kohm. A Comparath'f!
Sun<eyo/Covmant Marriage Proposals in thtt Unitm States, 12 REGENT U. L. �. 31 (1999);
Stfl also Brian H. Bllc, Smte ofIhe Union: 17re Stares' lntere$1 In the Marita/ Star11s of Their
Citizens, SS U. MlAMI L. R.Ev. I (2000). The Colorado legislature recently considered a highly
publicized bill lhat generally woold baVc required spo=s with children to undergo a year of
counseling before divorcing. Stt H.R. 01-1342, 63rd Gen. Asscm, ht Reg. Sess. (Colo.
2001). The bill ultimately was defeated in committee. See Henley. supra note 2SS, at Al.
272. Difonm, supra note S3, at 884-88.
273. &e Victor E. Scbwutt. TireSerious Marital Offendu: TortLaw 11.t a Solution, 6 FAM.
LQ. 219, 225 (1972). Professor Schwartz argues for recognizing a tort action against a serious
mariial olTendcr--Oiat is a spouse. A tort action against a divorcing spouse docs oot undermine
the no-fault divorce regime, he argues, bccallSe fault is not being used u the basis for the
divorce, Uld the conduct lhat is actionable is beyond the "normal hostile acts" or divorcing
spouses. Id. at 225.
274. This is what the plaintiffargued inNeal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994).

1038

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

divorces.275 Although I am not prepared to argue for a tort theory against a
spouse who commits adultery, leaving the matter for now to divorce law, I
think there are some good arguments for such a theory. 276
A second parallel between the marriage interference torts and wrongful
discharge is that courts are reluctant to get involved in second guessing
decision makers in divorces and employment terminations. Although both
involve among the most gut-wrenching of emotional injuries, courts do not
like to deal with the difficult issues of determining whether wrongful
conduct has occurred, allocating fault, and determining causation. One
judge, dicussing employment at-will, recognized the courts' reluctance in
both areas as follows: "Our law chooses not to involve itself with the unfair
and subjective treatment leading to these broken at-will relationships in a

275. Schwa.11Z, s11pra note 273 Professor Schwartz did not take issue with �1c no-faull
divorce regime, but he argued for the need for tort-based liability for "serious marital
offenders." He contended that an act of adultery would not satisfy the requirements of the tort,
but ho did say that if a spouse corrunittcd adultery and "bmg[ gcd] about it with the intent to
cause his spouse resultant serious emotional harm," whe�m that act satisfied the tort should be
a jury question.
Id. at 22S. Ironically, in liaht of Schwartz's poinl it was the unfaithful
spouse's nondisclosure of his extramarital affair that made viable the wife's banery claim
agaim1 him n
i Neal v. Neal. 873 P.2d at 875. For discussion of the Neal case, see supra notes
118-120 and accompanying text. One researcher concluded, on the basis of a survey, that
i more likely to save a marriage than is trying not to
talking about all the details of an affair s
focus on the affair and avoiding talk about it. Francine Russo, Wiii He Cheat? WI// You?,
RED900K, June I, 2000, at 132 (discussing survey by San Diego-based psychological consultant
Peggy Vaughan). Regarding tort lheories against a spouse, see also Ellman & Sugannan, s11pra
note 250, at 1268 (considering argumen1s for and against recognition of a tort of spousal
emotional abuse under the rubric of intentional infliction of emotional distress; concluding that
suchrecognition probably would be a mistake).
276. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. L\RSON, HARO BARGAINS: TuE P01.mcs OF SEX
283-86 (1998) (arguing for a tort theory of adultery). I thank Professor Chamallas for her
insight that my failure to take a position on the tort theory against the unfaithful spouse weakens
the analogy to wrongful tennination. Although I am no1 prepared to argue for that tort in this
article, I think the arguments for such a theory ofrecovery are persuasive.
Professor Larson has argued for a lort theory of sexual fraud. Larson, supra note 59.
Professor Dan Subolnik, in response to Larson, has argued that if an obligation were imposed on
norunanied sexual partners to tell the truth, then such a tort should be recognized for spouses.
Dan Subotnik, "Sue Me. Sue Me, What Can You Do Me? ILove Yo11" A Disquisition on Law,
Sex, a11d Talk, 47 Fl.A. L. REv. 311, 358 (1995). Subotnik suggests that we are not ready lo
recognize such a tort between spouses. Id. Of course, this s
i precisely the set of circumstances
under which the plaintiff in Neal v. Neal stated a viable battery claim against her ex-husband.
873 P.2d at 875. She argued that, bad she known ofher ex-husband's adultery, she would have
found sexual relations with him offensive, thus constituting a banery. Id. at 876. Moreover, she
argued 1hat her consent was negated by her husband's misrepresentation through nondisclosure.
Id. at 876-77. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized a viable battery claim without
creang
it a new tort ofsexual fraud. Id.
.
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manner which is somewhat analogous to no-fault divorce."2n
One
commentator has posited that a reason that American jurisdictions
unanimously adopted employment at will was that it enabled the courts to
dismiss cases in which they did not think they were competent to evaluate
the termination decisions of employers.m
A third parallel between the marriage n
i terference torts and wrongful
discharge is that employment is one of the major relationships that people
have, not only providing a livelihood, but also contributing much to a
person's identity. 279 The relationship is deemed so important that it is
necessary for tort law to be invoked to protect the relationship. The same
thing might be said of marriage.

B. Femills
i m, Liberalism, Sexual Libertarianism, and Commrmitarianism
Feminists led the campaign to abolish the heart balm torts.280 Male
legislators in Indiana "gallantly" yielded their support, and even playfully
voted token opposition before becoming serious and supporting the
281
Feminists of the early 1900s through the 1980s, rebelling
feminists.
against the image of the powerless, economically dependent, and sexually
repressed woman, embraced the liberal ideals of individualism and
autonomy, which called for government to keep its hands out of regulation
of sex through law. Some feminists in the 1990s began questioning whether
a sexual free market adequately protects and advances the interests of
women, while libertarians have continued to support nonintervention by

government and a free market of sexual choice and activity. At the same
time, communitarian ideals of collectivity and responsibility have attracted
some feminists to reconceptualize their views of legal regulation of sexual
activity. Moreover, some torts theorists have embraced comrnunitarianism
and seen its precepts as supporting a larger role for relational torts.
Feminists, liberals, libertarians, and comrnunitarians-what do they have
to do with criminal conversation and alienation of affections? What role
2n. Nicholas v. Allstare Ins. Co., 739 So. 2d 830, 8SO (La. Ct. App. 1999) (Caraway, J.,

dissenting), rev'd, 165 So. 2d 1017 (La. 2000).

sm nt o
f
278. Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassese
theRise ofEmployment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. RE.v. 679 (1994).
279. Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the
Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L REY. 719, 719 (1991) ("The
identification of personality with employment elevates employment to a very high ranking
among the non-economic interests valued by Americans.").
280. See supra noteS 92-114 and accompanying text
281. Aching Hearts, supra note 96 (reponing that fiv.� men voted "no" "in a spirit of fun"
before changing their voteS).
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have various ideologies played in the demise of the heart balm torts? In
short, feminists, fueled by liberal views of autonomy and individualism,
spearheaded the assault on the heart balm torts.
Recently, some femin.ist scholars have called for re-examination of two
of the heart balm torts. Professor Mary Coombs, in describing the role of
feminists in abolishing the breach-of-promise tort, recognized that feminists
took the position they did to help women break out of the subservient and
dependent role they played in traditional marriages. 282 She observes that
they perceived it to be in women' s best interest in the long run, and to do
otherwise would have had ideological costs. 283 She observes, however, that
although the breach-of-promise tort was "imperfect," it did provide a
remedy for women who had suffered real injuries.284 Her thesis, then, is
that feminists today should not be as dismissive of the actions of
"traditional" and "activist right-wing" women as were the feminists who
285
fought against the breach-of-promise tort.
Professor Larson, in an article that has attracted considerable attention,
advocated revisiting the tort of seduction and, from its ashes, resurrecting a
86
new tort of sexual fraud. 2 She recounts the role of the earlier feminists,
and like Professor Coombs, she concludes that feminists took such active
roles in the anti�heart balm movement because the success was a symbolic
victory, replacing the Victorian concept of economically dependent and
sexually passive women who were no more than men's property, with a
new conception of emancipated women. 287 She notes tlie tension between
the rhetoric of women being depicted as golddiggers and men as victims on
the one hand, and the feminist · goal of advancing a new vision of women on
88
the other hand. 2
When the second wave of anti-heart balm legislation came in the 1970s,
it occtirre d at the same time that many other faws governing sexual relations
were in a state of change, including rape laws and sexual harassment law .289
It also occurred at a time when feminism had become a major force in
American society. 290 Professor Larson, in proposing the new tort of sexual
fraud, argues that feminist adherence to the liberal value of autonomy will
·

282. Coombs, supra note 59, at 14.
283. Id. at 1 7 .
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id. at 2 1 -23.

Larson, supra note 59.
Id. at 397-99.
Id. at 394-40 1 .

289. Id. at 400.
290. Sinclair, supra note 1 03 , at 96-97 (discussing the societal arid legal changes of the
1960s and 1970s wrought by feminists).
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not better the position of women. She argues that many women remain
economically dependent on men in traditional relationships.291 In view of
that reality, the libertarian rhetoric which opposes legal regulation of sexual
activity does not serve women well.292 Thus, she urges feminists to re
examine their allegiance to the libertarian "sexual free market"29J and to
support "a sexually nonrepressive,
t interventionist, regime of sexual
�
regulation in lbc interests of women."
This view leads her to propose the
tort of sexual fraud.
Professor Larson is not alone in her view that the liberal ideals of
autonomy and individualism and the libertarian mantra of nonregulation are
not adequate to advance the best interests of women. Professor Nedelsky
has argued that feminists need to redefine the liberal ideal of autonomy in a
way that includes communitarian ideals.29'
Another commentator has urged a re-examination of law governing the
premarital relationship.296 She posits that the argument from the anti-heart
balm movement that love should not be commodified led to mandatory
rules regarding return of engagement rings and a refusal on the part of
courts to consider the claims of women for the investments they make in
preparatioo for marriage.297
Libertarians, for their part, call for abstinence on the part of
government-leaving sexual conduct to the free market.
Professor
Carrington 's prototype of the Sexual Libertarian Senator is characterized by
a beliefthat individuals should make their own choices.298 It is obvious that
i many battles, such as
libertarian ideology has been helpful to feminists n
reproductive self-determination. It is not clear, however, that libertarian
principles serve women equally well in other contexts.
Communitarian thinking bas had an impact on tort law. For example,
Professor Levit wrote that relational torts "evidence a communitarian view
of the role oftort law. . . . [in which] (t)be vision being promoted is one of
responsible social interaction."299 Professor Chamalias has argued that deep
biases embedded in tort law continue to relegate emotional and relational
torts, and concomitantly women's injuries, to a lower status in the hierarchy
291. Lmao,svpni noce S9, at 427-28.
292 id. at 432-33.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 381.
295. Ncdclsky, supra note 149. For a discussion of communitarian ideology applied to
relational torts, sec supra note 156 and accompanying text.
296. Tusbnet, supN note 98, at 2587-91.
297. Id. at 2618.
298. Curington, supN note 60, at 864�9.
299. Levit.supra noce48,at 150.
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of tons, which favors the male-oriented physical and property injuries.JOO
Although communitarian ideology seems consistent with, and supportive of,
tort law's protection of relational and emotional interests, that docs not
mean that all proponents of communitarian ideology believe tort law should
expand its coverage of emotional and relational injuries. For example,
Professor Robert Ackennan bas argued for limitations on emotiona.1 distress
and relational n
i jury recoveries as a way of controlling the "tort loncry."301
He is particularly critical of the heart balm torts, writing that detennining
the cause of the breakup of a marriage requires "judicial involvement in
intimate and complex human relationships to a disturbing dcgree.'.JOl
Sounding more libertarian than conununitarian, l03 Ackennan argues that the
abolition of the heart balm torts was a move n
i the right direction-keeping
courts out of people's bedrooms.304
What happens then, when feminism, which had aligned with liberalism,
and at times libertarianism, but now questions the marriage, looks wistfully
at communitarianism?
Do criminal conversation and alienation of
affections look better? The answer is not clear. Professor Charnallas, who
writes so powerfully about tbe subordination of the emotional and relational
torts which disadvantages women, does not like the heart balm 1oru. She
writes that, although adultery is ham1ful conduct, it is no longer useful as a
legal category. JOS She contends that the harm resulting from adultery is "not
i jury that the law ought to redress."306 She bases this pnmarily
the sort of n

on the lllstorical roots of the tort in which women we.re treated as their
husband's property and her fear that recogni:z.ing the tons would replicate
the sexist ideology of an earlier era.m
In this melange, it is difficult to say which movements or ideologies or
combinations thereof, would favor or oppose an interference with marriage
tort. It is not far-fetched to suggest, however, that f
eminism, tinged with
communitarian.ism, should favor such a tort.

300. Cbamallas,""'"' 1I04C 48passim.
301. Aclcennan,supnr note47, at 667-68.
302. Id. at 669-701 (citttioo omitted).
303. As he cenainly has a right to sound. ProfCS!Or Ackerman stales that, although he is
sympathetic with communiiarianism, he is not a "True Believer." Id. a1 6S2 n. l I and
accompanyign text.
304. Id. at 670.
305. Cbamallas. ""'"1 note 5, al 338.
306. Id. at 341.
307. Id.
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C. Regulation ofthe Market and Regulation ofthe Family: A
Comparative Historical Perspective
A comparison of the history of legal regulation of the commercial market
and regulation of the family in the United States yields some insights that
may be relevant to the demise of the marriage interference torts. Professor
Frances Olsen describes market and family as two spheres of socfal activity

which have been viewed as constituting a dichotomy. :MJR The family sphere
has been characterized as female, private, and altruistic, and structuring
people's affective lives, whereas the market has been envisioned as ma
public, and individualistic, and structuring people's productive lives.
Ols-cn describes the three stages of the historical evolution of legal
regulation of the market and the family. For the market the stages arc as
follows: first, the feudal period of hierarchical organization and laws that
maintained the hierarchy; second, the rise of the free (laissez-faire) market
n
i which the state largely withdrew from regulation of the marketplace; and
IO
third, the welfare state with significant regulation of economic activity. J
Olsen describes the similar historical stages of regulation of the family:
first, the feudal family with a hierarchy that was fortified by heavy
regulation by law; second, liberalization of the family in which government
witlhdrew and changed the laws that ossified the hierarchical relations, thus
moving family relations toward equal juridical rights between men and
women; and third, the stage of the regulated family in which government,
through courts, legislatures, and agencies, has ste ed back in to address,
through regulation, issues of inequality and abuse. 1 The movement n
i the
market to a welfare regime has moved the market toward reduced

�

p.
�

individualism and a new hierarchy, whereas increased regulation of the
Jil
family has moved it away from hierarchy and toward individualism.
Feminists, in seekjng liberalization of the hierarchical family, argued for
individual freedoms. According to Olsen, the focus of family reform on
individualism has made family relations resemble market relations.31J

3:08. Olsen, supra note SS, at 1498.

309. Id. at 1498-1501.
310. Id. Bl 1513-15.
31 l. Id. at 1516-18.
312. Id. at 1528.
313. Id. at 1519. However, refonners who spearheaded the anti-heart balm lcaislation
wielded an argwnent that was grounded oo dilfcrentiating ma� of love from lnlnsactions in
the commercial madcCIS. Tushnet, supra note 98, al 2589-90. They argued for a "fuewall
between personal. disinrerested love relarions and the selfish mart.eL" Id. at 2589. Thus, it was
both unnecessary and unseemly to allempl to assuage emotions damaged in matters oflove with
money damages.
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As for reform efforts, Olsen criticizes perpetuating the dichotomy.
Trying to make the family more like the market, replicates both the
successes and the failures of the market.314 The juridicial equality of the
As for the
market is not adequate or appropriate for the family.
individualism of the market, as applied to the family, such individualism
JIS
"discow1ts communal ties and promotes isolation."
What does the comparative history of regulation of the market and
family have to do with the demise of criminal conversation and alienation
of affections? First, it sheds some light on why the torts fell. Second, it
may provide some insights into whether they are likely to be revived and
whether they should be.
As for the history, feminists supported heart balm legislation in the
1930s and again in the 1970s. The revulsion toward the torts was based
316
upon a view of them as relics of the feudal period from which they come.
Although women who were injured were able to use the torts to recover,
feminists saw them as cementing the hierarchy of the feudal family in place,
and they preferred the individualism and autonomy that had emerged in the
market. Even today it is the clash between the historical roots of the torts
and modem views of the e uality of the sexes that leads to the most robust
denunciations of the torts.31
What does or should this historical perspective forecast for marriage
interference torts? The answer is not clear, but some observations are
relevant. Many view the family as having now moved, albeit at a slower
pace than the market,3 18 into a period in which the state becomes involved,
once again, in regulation. Recall that during the feudal period the role of
government regulation of family was to ossify the unequal relationships.
Such has not been the case in the recent period of regulation. One purpose

�

314. Olsen, supra note SS, at IS30.
315. Id.
316. It is not surprisi ng that during the feudal period, criminal conversation and aliena1ion
of affections were based on hierarchical rel ations and notions of a husband's propeny. As
Professor Olsen explicates the feudal period, there was no separation between the market and
the family. Id. at 1516. Both market and family were based on a hierarchy tha1 was considered
tobethe naturalorderofthings. Id.at 1Sl3, 1516.
317. See, e.g., Doses. supra note 7, at 1247-48.
[T]he torts have become offensive because they have, sometimes quite
explicitly, treated a spouse as the property of the other spouse and because
they are thoroughly n
i imical to the freedom of every human being to choose
their associations and to depart dangerous, stultifying, or deeply unhappy
homes ifthey choose.

Id.

318. The lag theory posits that changes in the family replicate changes in the market, but
the rate of change for the family lags behind that of the market. Olsen, supra note 55,at 1513.
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of government regulation bas been lo help women both in the market and at
the intersection of market and family. ln the market, for example, feminists
supponed anti-discrimination in employment law.319
Federal anti
discrimination law and the anti-harassment law thereunder have assisted

women in pursuing equality in the workplace. ln contrast to the marriage
interference torts, it has not bothered feminists that women have been
depicted as victims of men's power In the anti-discrimination laws. Indeed,
they have embraced that image and argued that victimization bas made the
regulation ncccssary. m Federal law also has been called upon lo regulate
market activity so as not to disadvantage women due to the unequal burdens
they bear with family rew
onsibility. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
amendments of Title VIl3 and the Family and Medical Leave Act322 are
examples.
Feminist support of federal and analogous state discrimination law
indicates that feminists favor some governmental regulation of the market
and perhaps the family. Does that suppon extend to only public law? As
discussed above, some modem feminists have argued for reinstitution or
reconsideration of modem versions of some of the heart balm torts.32J
Moreover, other tons commentators have discussed the case for tort theories
against abusive spouscs.3lA

In comparing the current state of regulation of conduct in the market and
!he family, some have noted that there is more regulation of th.e commercial
market than of sexual conduct325 or the family. For example, leading
commentators on tort law have noted that, although family relations are
"among the most delicate and most im rta
nt in our society," they receive
�
6 As discussed above, the ton of
only limited protection under tort law.2
n
i terference wilh business is recognized, in some form, in all states,

319. See. ..g., Id. at 1552.
320 Id. \tA)ntidiscnminalion law legitimates women"s C0111plaints of unfair treatment and
provides women with a vehicle for fighting back against institutions that oppress them.'").
321. 42 u.s.c. § 200()e(J<) ( l994).
322. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Although the FMLA does not
distinguish between men and women n
i the entitlements it creat<s, the Act itself sllltes that "due
to the narurc ofthe roles of men and women In our sociecy, the rrimary rcsponsibilicy for fami
ly
caretalcing often falls on women. and such raponsibilicy affccu the working lives of women
more than it affcctS the working lives ofmen." Id. at§ 2601(aX5).
f Coombs, supra
323. See la1$0n supra note 59 (proposing a new tort of se1ual fraud); c
note 59 (suggesting that breach-of-promise lO many ton plaintiffs were IOO cavalierly sbunn<d
by feminists who supporud abolition ofthecause ofaclion).
324. Schwartz, supra note 273; Ellman & Sugannnn, supra oote 250.
325. Larson. supra note 59, ll 412 ('"Many scholars have noted the asymmetric legal
proteelion provided within the commercial as opposed to the SCX'lal sphere."') (citation omiaed);
Rasmuson, supra note 237, at 17.
326. HARPER ET AL. supra nouo 8, at 499-500.
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m
although its appropriate parameters is a controversial topic.
In contrast,
the marriage interference torts have been abolished in jurisdiction after
If family follows the market into a state of increased
jurisdiction.
regulation, it is not far-fetched to think that some type of marriage
interference tort might be a part of such increased regulation. It is not
necessary that a modem tort of interference with marriage be based on
321
anachronistic principles regarding men's property interests in their wives.
If the family is following the market, then legal theoreticians should
overcome the common revulsion with the prior conceptualization of the
torts of criminal conversation and alienation of affections and examine
whether a modem iteration of the torts is an appropriate private Jaw
regulation.

D. American Society and Sexual Mores
29
Ton theoreticians posit that tort law reflects society's valucs.'
lf
marital fidelity and supposed concomitant family stability are highly valued
by American society, then why have the torts of criminal conversation and
alienation of affections been in decline for over sixty-five years? Two
issues merit attention here. First, what do Americans say they believe about
adultery? Second, what are the practices of Americans regarding marital
sexual fidelity?
First, when surveyed, an overwhelming percentage of Americans say
that adultery is wrong.330 Indeed, the percentage so indicating cams the
United States standing as the most sexually conservative nation in the

327. Su supra DOCGr 237-247 andaccompanyiJlg uoxL
328. Su Laison, supra note 59, at 381 ("The identification of the tort of SCJCual mud with
women's passivity and with hostilily lO sex s
i not 1 necessary one, but rather rcOceu the
convergence of contingent social and historical forces.'').
329. See, e.g.. Marshall S. Shapo, /n theLoolcing Glass: What TorrsScholanhfp Can Teach
UsAboutthe American Experience, 89NW. U. L. REv. 1567, 1569 (1995) ("Tort jurisprudence
s
i a rclatively accurate rcOector of American society's basic principles for microgovemance.").
330. Scot Lehigh, Everything Yau Always Wanted to Know About the SexualRevolution But
Probably Didn't Ask, BOSmN 01,.()BE, May 14, 2000, at El (discussing scholarly paper
comparing attitudes about sex in twenty-four European and Asian countries, finding that 80% of
Americans swveyed said that extramarital sex is always wrong); Handy, supra oouo 54.
Although the demise of the martial n
i uorfercnce torts began n
i the 1930s, more abroptioos
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. Because of that and because $lll'VC)'S and polls were not a
national fetish in the 1930s, this section will discuss survey information rcgarding the last tbilty
years. My guess is that the pcn:entagc ofAmericans saying adultery is wrong V.'Ould have been
higher in the 1930s than t
i is now. Thus, my questioo would be the same then as now: When an
ovCTWbelming majority ofthe population says something is morally wrong, sboul<I tort theories

addrcs.1ing that conduct be abrogal1>d?
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Western world.m A comparison of recent surveys with similar surveys in
the late 1970s indicates that more Americans now believe adultery is wrong
than believed that n
i the 1970s."2 It probably is not surprising that adultery

is less acceptable now than it was during the "sexual revolution" of lhe
1960s and 1970s.
Regarding practice, it is very difficult to get reliable data on how many
married people have extramarital sex. A recent survey suggests that either a
fairly high percentage of married people are having affairs, or at least, many
Americans perceive that to be true. In the same survey in which about 85%
said Ibey believe adultery is morally wrong, 69% said they knew at least
one husband who had an affair, and 60% said they knew at least one such
wife.333 In that survey, 62% said they "!bought less" of the adulterous
husband, and 56% said they thought less of such a wife, notwithstanding
about 85% saying they believe adultery is wrong. 3l4
It is common political rhetoric today to discuss family values,"5 and the
topi c was not n
i vented by former Vice President Dan Quayle. Yet, for all
the talk, it seems appropriate to question whether Americans• love affair
with marriages with sexual fidelity as a cornerstone is exaggerated. The
surveys indicate that extramarital sex does occur at some significant level.
Moreover, books, movies, ond television make it appear that extramarital
sex is

commonplace, and make it appear romantic and even heroic.336 My

point is not to bemoan the sordid state of Hollywood,337 but instead to
331.
332.
333.
334.
33S.
336.

Lehigh. supra nocc 330.

Handy,supra note S4.
Id.
Id.

Olsen, supra noteSS, at 1497; see also Larson, supra note S9, at 433 n..254.
I do not believe this requires citation of much authority, but consider, for example, the
book and movie The Bridges of Madison County, in which the female procagonist has an
extnmarital alTalr with a man who COlllC$ IO her farm whi
l e her husband and children are away.
Thebook and movie end with the man leaving, and the woman Slaying behind, and the reader or
viewer lj)p8J'tntly supposed IO feel that it isa tragedy that she feels imprisoned in her dull life.
ROBERT JAMES WALLER, 1llE BRIOOES OF MADISON COUNTY (1992); 1llE BRIOOES OF
MADISON COUNTY (Warner Bros. I99S). The producers of the recent television show
Temptal/011 Island chose IO subject ..committed" but unmarried couples to sexual temptation.
The producers rejected use of married couples because that would have been eocouraging
adultery. Walt Belcher, 'Temptation Island" ls No Paradise, TAMPA Tlus., Jan. 11, 2001, at 4.
Cheati..g Spouses: Caught on Tape on the UPN network is a hone of a different color. It
definitely shows ICU of adultery, although it probably is no1 fair IO characterize it as promoling
adultery. CheatingSpouses: Caughr on Tape (I.JPN television broadcast, Oct. 20, 2000).
sion study regarding the
337. I need not do that since the Federal Trade Commis's
marlceting of R-rated movies, music, and video games IO children and the subsequent
Congressional hearings undoubtedly will result in reform. See Betsy Streisand, Slasher Movies
the Family Can Enjoy: Hollywood Con Find Loopholes in Its Promises, U.S. NEWS & WORU>
REP., Oct. 9, 2000, at SO.
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suggest that Hollywood and the various media have a significant m
i pact on
Americans• views on what is morally acceptable, or at least, on what sexual
practices occur with some frequency.
In the end, what can be said about sexual mores regarding adultery is that
a very high percentage of Americans say adultery is wrong, probably some

not insubstantial percentage engage in adultery, and most Americans
believe adultery occurs fairly often and believe that they know someone
who has engaged in it. There is a disconnect between the ideal and the

actual, or what is perceived to be actual.
Regardless of the views on marriage and sexual mores, much is being
written and spoken about the general decline of morality and traditional
va.lues in the United States.338 Even if Americans might believe that one
can have an extramarital affair and still be a moral person, the issue of
sexual fidelity could be swept up in a campaign for a "return" to traditional
values and morality.

V. SHOULD AN INTERFERENCE Wini MAA!UAOE TORT BE RECOGNIZED?
Only nine states now recognize either criminal conversation, a.lie.nation

of affections, or both. Setting aside for a moment what a modified tort
theory of interference with marriage should look like, consider first whether
such a theory of recovery should be recognized.
To begin with, a strong case never was made for the abolition of criminal
conversation and alienation of affections.339 It bears repeating that it is a
remarkable event that established tort theories that redress devastating
emotional injuries were abolished without a compelling case having been
made for their abolition. That alone is not a reason, however, that should
sustain the rena.issaoce of such torts. I think there are good reasons for
states to consider recognizing a new interference with marriage tort.

A. Redressfor Interferences with Family Relations
As discussed above, tort law in the last seventy years or so increasingly
has recognized tort recovery for emotional and relational harms. In view of
the fact that many jurisdictions recognize theories that redress direct injuries
to economic and employment relationships, the absence of theories that
redress direct injuries to family relationships, specifically marriage, is

338. See, e.g., David Broder, Yoters Worried America is Backsliding, ADVOCATE (Baton
Roogc) June 30, 1999, at 78.
339. See supra Section lIL
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conspicuous. J«> One can explain the difference by saying that family
relationships are private matters involving affective aspects of life, and
courts are not well suited to addressing such matters. It is not clear,
however, why courts are incompetent to deal with such matters. Consider,
for example, courts' recent forays into emotional injuries and employment
issues.
The refusal to provide ton redress for interference with the marital
relationship may indicate several undesirable things about tort law in the
United States. Professor Chamallas has noted that to cordon off emotional
and relational harms from judicial competence is to maintain in ton law the
disfavored status of n
i juries suffered to a greater extent by women. 341 As
other commentators on tort law have observed, the abolition of the tons has
left no means of redress at law when "grievous wrongs are suffered and
some of life's most important interests ruthlessly invaded."l'l Leaving
persons with devastating emotional injuries, without recourse at law, could
lead to self help. At least, it leaves people with the belief that they were
victims of wrong for which the law provides no redress. Finally, if ton law
i terference with employment and business
provides redress for n
relationships but not a family relationship, what message does that send
about the relative importance of family relationships in our society? If one
rejects the incompetence of the court to address affective issues and the
other reasons regarding the limitations of tort law given in the· past for
abolition of criminal conversation and alienation of affections, such as
nondeterrence and insoluble causation and blame issues, then one is left
with the answer that family relations are not as important as employment

and business relations. That very well may be true.
It is also questionable whether palpable injuries to one of rhe most
significant relationships in our society should be left to coverage under an
i tentional infliction of emotional distress.
occasional tort theory, such as n
For the employment relationship, the movement has been in the opposite
direction-to recognize a direct tort theory for abusive discharges and
interferences with the employment relationship.34l If the relationship of
marriage is important enough to be protected by tort law, should plaintiffs
340. HARPER ET AL, supra note 8, at 499-500 (stating that although family �lations arc
among the "most delicate and impor1ant in our society," they arc given little protection under

tort Jaw).

341. Chamallas, supra note 48, at 499.
342. HARPERET AL, supra note 8, at 535.
343. Many states have recognized the tort theory of recovery for wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy.

Some

stales

have codified wron&ful discllluge

actions. Su, e.g.,

MOITT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-915 (2001); lA. REV. STAT. A'IN. § 23:967 (West
1998).
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be made to try to fit their claims into occasional relational tort theories?
They will seldom be able to convince a court that adultery is outrageous
enough to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. If it were,
then criminal conversation or alienation of affections would be

recognized.344

In sum, it s
i a gaping and, for me, inexplicable hole in tort law coverage
l to provide some theory of recovery for interference with marriage.
to fai

B. Harm Suffered by Women to a Greater Extent
I realize that feminists historically have supported abolition of criminal
conversation and alienation of affections. I think the questions raised by
some modem feminist writers about the position of the feminists regarding
the heart balm tons demands an answer: Was it appropriate for feminists to

support the abolition for the purpose of destroying stereotypes of women
when the tort theories offered individual female plaintiffs who were injured
i appropriate
a means of redress, and if it was, docs such a position reman
now?)4s
Women suffer more from adultery than men suffer. Professor Chamallas

cites numerous writers for the proposition that

men

suffer

A

greater

emotional injury from discovering that their spouses have engaged n
i
adultery than do women; she describes the injury as a kind of emasculation
and a wound to men's "manly pride.',)46 On the other hand, Professor
Larson argues that women, as the "emotional workers," are more likely to
suffer emotional injury than men)4l I do not wish to speculate whether
arn
of a spouse's
men or women suffer a greater emotional injury upon le
adultery. The injury is great for both men and wome
n
.
I do argue,
however, that the collective injuries to women are greater for two reasons.
First, the survey data regarding extramarital sexual activity suggest, and
most people would guess, that married men engage in adultery more than
married women)49 Second, if discovered adultery leads to divorce, as it

\:!I

344. Scamardo v. Dunaway, 694 So. 2d 1041, 1042 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Quinn v. Walsh,
732 N.E.2d 330, 338 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
345. SeeCoombs, supra note 59, at 15-19; Larson, supra note 59, at 397-401.
346. Chamallas, supra note 5, at 340-41.
347. Larson, supra note 59, at 448-49.
348. See SPIUNO, supra note 5.
349. See Rasmusel\ supra note 237, at 2 n.1 (discussing "conventional wisdom" and a case
study in a Virginia county).
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often does, 350 the collateral losses of women are likely to be greater than
those of men; women bear the brunt of the economic and life opportunity
costs.
Although women have made some strides toward economic
independence, it is still true that many married women are, to a large extent,
economically dependent on their husbands. 35 1 Anti-heart balm reformers in
the 1 930s argued for a view of marriage in which emotions, not economics,
controlled decisions.352 It should not be a . stunning revelation to state that
the view of the reformers which called for insulating marriage issues from
the cold economic forces of the market was not realistic then and certainly
is not today. 353 Money and economics matter in matters of the heart-both
at the point of marriage and divorce. If a divorce occurs, quite often the
woman will have more difficult financial circumstances,354 and, if there are
children, she may still have the principal child raising responsibilities.
Moreover, both the disadvantaged financial circumstances and the family
responsibilities are a result of the woman's investment in the marriage. 355 I
do not suggest that a tort theory for interference with marriage would
provide a remedy for all the economic injuries flowing from adultery and
divorce. I do contend, however, that married women who divorce generally
suffer economic loss as well as emotional harm. If women do suffer greater
350. See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994); Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d
554, 559 (N.C. App. 1999), review denied, 514 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999), appeal dismissed, 542
S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 2000) .
351. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 59, at 427-28 ("Despite notable advances in recent
decades by an elite group of American women, persistent economic dependency and tenacious
sex roles continue to make connection to a man an important avenue to a stable and secure life
for many women."); see also Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault:
Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 63-66 (1991) (discussing views of
some that no-fault divorce has badly hurt women and children economically).
352. Tushnet, supra note 98, at 2615.
353. Id.
354. Professor Perry analogizes a divorce to an accident in tort law and identifies primary,
secondary, and tertiary costs of a divorce. Perry, supra note 351, at 66-70. The secondary
costs, which she identifies as "economic costs to the individuals and to society include the
economic costs to the spouse who has sacrificed or compromised her career in order to further
the interests of her marriage." Id. at 68; see also Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning
Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance to Call It Property, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 109
(1996) (arguing that divorcing spouse's interest in the property of their spouse's enhanced
earning power should be recognized) . In the Hutelmyer case, the court cited the plaintiff's
evidence of loss of income, life insurance, and pension benefits as part of the evidence
supporting the award of $500,000 in compensatory damages. Hutelmyer, 514 S.E.2d at 561.
Professor Rasmusen notes that a spouse's threat to divorce upon discovering adultery will not
be credible and thus will not deter adultery if the faithful spouse has made substantial
investments in the marriage. The investments mean the faithful spouse has too much to lose.
Rasmusen, supra note 23 7, at 2.
355. See source cited supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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collateral loss from adultery, then not providing a tort remedy for
interference with marriage will adversely affect women more thll!l men.
Providing a theory of recovery for interference with marriage might not
provide a substantial source of recovery for all or most plaintiffs. Some
defendants would have the resources to satisfy a judgment, and some would
not. This is no different from most other intentional tort theories. Many
defendants in a battery claim will not be able to satisfy a judgment, unless
they have an insurance policy that covers it. 356 The potential that some
judgments will be unrecoverable, however, has not been seen as a reason to
abolish the tort theory of battery. In the context of adultery, if divorce
results, the unfaithful spouse may contribute to satisfaction of a judgment
against the third party, and I do not see that as negative.357

C. Current Views in Society Favoring Reconsideration
There is a public discourse about family values and morality and concern
with moral decline in American society. There is also a movement to
change the no-fault divorce regime. 318 Perhaps most importantly, feminist
scholars and others have questioned both some of the results and some of
the underlying arguments of the heart balm abolition movement. Feminists
and others are re-examining the very real emotional and economic injuries
suffered by women before, during, and after marriages and questioning
whether current family and tort law provide adequate protection. Ln a
society in which such views are being expressed, it is appropriate to
reconsider the need for an interference with marriage tort.
I realize that there is substantial opposition, wielding well-reasoned
arguments, to recognition of such a tort. I know that the recognition of a
modified tort, such as the one I propose in the next section, will create many
problems. Nonetheless, in contemporary American society, with the issues
being debated, the time has come to reconsider the marriage interference
torts.

356. See Smith v. St Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 622 F. Supp. 867, 867-77 (W.D. Aik. 1985)
(holding that liability for alienation ofaffections was covered by insurance policy).
357. I realize that some may read into this the old arguments against criminal conversation
and alienation of affections on the ground that they are panicularly susceptible to blackmail or
extortion. I do not think, however, that the incentives to settle such a suit are significantly
different from the incentives in olher types of tort actions.
358. See Jones, supra note 40, at 86-88 (citingthis as a reason for reconsidering the torts).
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VI. A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE
WITII

There

are

conversation.

problems

MARRIAGE TORT

with

alienation

of

affections

and

criminal

Professor Dobbs' critique of interference torts raises a

number of concerns.

The one that troubles me the most is that the

interference torts potentially impose liability for interference perpetrated by
359
speech.
Applying that criticism to alienation of affections, parents or
others might be sued for trying to persuade their child to leave an abusive
spouse or companion. Although parents and others might avoid liability on
360
the potential coverage of speech as interference is
the basis of privilege,
troubling. An angry spouse might sue a would-be suitor who uses speech to
try to entice a married person.

Although it could be argued that if the

propositioned spouse does not leave his spouse or commit adultery, the
plaintiff spouse would be unlikely to recover, the potential for trivial
lawsuits and the potential infringement on speech are vexing.
The concern with application of the torts to speech may be viewed as
part of a larger criticism of the interference with business torts-that the tort
361
does not proscribe specific conduct, but instead a state of mind.
A concern I have with criminal conversation is that the tort does not
require knowledge on the part of the interferer that the person is married.
Writing about the interference with business tort, Professor Wonnell argued
that the requirement of knowledge of the existence of the relationship is a
362
crucial element of the tort to avoid overdeterrence.
I think the same is
true of interference with marriage. Not requiring knowledge would impose
too great a burden on the market for sexual relations.

Moreover, the

knowledge requirement ensures that the interferer has a high level of
culpability or blameworthiness.

Without the knowledge requirement, one

could be liable for interference with marriage for having sexual relations
with a married person who misrepresented his marital status.
In light of the foregoing concerns and others and in recognition of the
fact that most states abolished the existing torts ,

I would confine the

revised tort to the specific conduct of adultery. Thus, the tort would borrow
the wrongful act requirement from criminal conversation and the knowledge
of the marriage requirement from alienation of affections.

I do not think

that proof of alienation of love and affection should be retained as an

359. Dobbs, supra note 24, at 361-63.
360. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8,

§ 686.

3 6 1 . Dobbs, supra note 24, at 347-50
362. Wonnell, supra note 1 6 1 , at 143-45.
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3
element of the tort. 63 That should be left to valuation of damages. Thus,
the elements of the new intentional interference with marriage tort would be
the existence of a valid marriage, defendant's knowledge of existence of
marriage, and sexual relations between the defendant and the spouse.
Consent of the nonparticipating spouse, a defense to criminal conversation,
should be a recognized defense and should be understood to include
marriages in which the spouses have agreed that exclusive sexual relations
is not part of their marriage.
This proposed tort is a narrow relational tort that certainly does not
364
It does, however,
address all interferences with the marital relationship.
address the type of interference that most Americans say is morally wrong
and the one that seems to provoke the greatest sense of outrage and injury in
married persons.

VII. CONCLUSION
Criminal conversation and alienation of affections have been under
assault for sixty-five years, and there is not much left of them.

The

abolition of two old torts in a time of general expansion of tort liability is a
remarkable occurrence, but few in the legal profession have remarked on it.
Although the reasons usually given for abolition of these torts are
unpersuasive, the demise can be understood in terms of changes in tort law,
ideological movements, and changes in societal views and values. The
Hutelmyer case brought the torts to the nation's attention briefly several
years ago. Notwithstanding that brief notoriety (or perhaps because of it), it
is likely that they will be abolished in the few states that continue to
recognize them in the near future.
I have argued that the case never was made effectively for the abolition
of the torts. Further, I have argued that there are good reasons to recognize
a revised tort theory that provides redress for intentional interference with
the important relationship of marriage. If recognized, would that tort theory

363. Jones, supra note 40, at 87 (noting problems with proof of existence of love and
affection and suggesting that proof of adultery might be sufficient).
364. Professor Chamallas posed the question whether I think the tort should be limited to
marriages in which the couple has children. That is a narrowing of the tort that I do not favor,
but I do think the arguments for the proposed tort are strongest in that context. The potential
harmful effects of adultery on children is a justification for the intervention of tort law to protect
the third-party interests. See supra notes 169, 255-56 and accompanying text.
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pn.: vcnt adultery and save families? O f course it would-just like the tort
365
l a w of battery prevents people from hitting each other and saves bodies.

365. I will not close without making clear that my title exaggerates the effect that I believe
the proposed tort would have. Nonetheless, complete deterrence has never been required by tort
law to justify the existence of a tort.

As I have suggested earlier, I think that tort law often

recognizes theories of recovery as a reflection of society's values and for other reasons, even
when the deterrent effect may be minimal. What conduct is deterred, for example , by the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress?

